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Summary 
Energy protests are becoming increasingly common and significant around the 
world. While in the global North concerns tend to centre around climate issues, in 
the global South the concerns are more often with affordable energy. Both types 
of protests, however, have one issue in common: the undemocratic nature of 
energy policymaking. This paper draws together findings from research 
conducted in three countries, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan to ask how 
and under which conditions do struggles over energy access in fragile and 
conflict affected settings empower the powerless to hold public authorities to 
account? In exploring this theme, the study examines what factors support 
protests developing into significant episodes of contention within fragile settings, 
and whether these energy struggles promote citizen empowerment and 
institutional accountability. 
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Energy protests have been recurrent and significant political events in the 
twenty-first century. Major episodes have erupted in rich countries and poor; in 
places with strong and stable states (France, Chile), as well as where states are 
fragile and conflict common (Mozambique, Haiti); in energy exporting countries, 
and those dependent on imports. There have been localised protests about 
electricity, and urban uprisings about fuel prices or transport fares. Some 
countries have had both these types of protest as well as others, including 
around new energy deals and infrastructure and transnational campaigns 
against fossil fuels.  
Why do people protest about energy, and what do their protests achieve? 
Despite their recent prominence, analysis of energy protests is in its infancy. This 
paper presents findings of research into this phenomenon. The interdisciplinary 
research synthesised here involved close-grained studies of energy protests in 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan, which were situated within their broader 
global context through cross-country analysis. The research asked: what political 
and economic conditions drive such protests? Do major episodes empower 
people to hold their governments accountable for energy provisioning? How do 
external and transnational interests shape the conditions in which mass protests 
unfold?1   
The research was primarily motivated by debates within contentious politics and 
social movement studies as they applied to governance and citizen participation 
in developing and fragile states. Energy protests provided a lens through which 
to understand the political opportunities for citizens to act collectively in the 
fragile and conflict-affected settings common to many developing countries. They 
enabled an examination of how popular grievances come to inform policy and 
politics in settings where political and civic space are captured or closed. The 
findings also speak to debates about ‘energy justice’ and how it might be 
achieved, which underscore the importance of civic participation, transparency 
and accountability in progress towards ‘just transitions’. Finally, understanding 
energy protests is also important for research, policy, and practice on fossil fuel 
subsidies and their reform. Mass protests about fuel price rises have frequently 
blocked or stalled efforts to eradicate subsidies seen as pro-rich and fiscally 
unsustainable. The research here reads these protests as signals that: a) energy 
is a basic need for modern life; and b) citizens lack more formal channels 
through which to voice their energy grievances.  
 
1  Separate papers will also be available on the cross-country analysis, and the country case studies for 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan. 
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The research found that protests were often triggered by grievances where 
formal channels – political parties, civil society, independent media – were 
blocked or weak. But while political fragility is linked to energy protests, protest 
episodes can create or contribute to fragility, depending on how governments 
respond. Energy provisioning of some kind was seen as part of the social 
contract in the three countries, and this provided a justification for protests 
demanding action to protect energy access. Yet there was limited evidence that 
the raw power of energy protests empowered citizens with respect to energy 
policy. Meaningful gains in citizen power were short-lived or diffuse, dissipating 
without institutionalised citizen engagement or lasting organisations. Major 
protest episodes taught protestors that en masse, they could force the 
government to hear their complaints. But they rarely elicited more than a heated 
public hearing, followed by often temporary policy change. In Nigeria, the 2012 
episodes reinforced the threat of mass protests against unpopular energy 
policies, succeeding not in pushing subsidy reform off the table, but in 
encouraging subsidy reformers to develop more tactical approaches to 
introducing reforms. In Mozambique, the food and fuel protests of 2008 and 
2010 taught the state to deploy extreme violence against protestors, to dampen 
any nascent struggles. 
Nor did energy protests lead to lasting or institutionalised public accountability to 
citizens, whether for energy or for any other essential public services. In the 
more disruptive episodes of protest, governments backed down on proposed 
price rises or introduced short-term fixes for electricity shortages. State tactics 
were to ward off protests, but rarely involved a visible strategy of strengthening 
public accountability for energy policy. In Pakistan, hundreds of protests against 
erratic electricity supply forced it onto the democratic political agenda; but 
electricity policymaking remains opaque, elitist, and technocratic, and no spaces 
or institutional practices were created to give citizens voice over their power 
supply. 
Protestors’ fleeting sense of power fuelled a self-reinforcing cycle: protestors 
believed it was all they could do, and governments feared protests but expected 
resistance to dissipate in time. Political parties in Pakistan and Nigeria took 
account of protestors’ – and the broader public’s – grievances about energy to 
some extent. But no political party in power had strong incentives to abandon 
either fuel subsidy reforms or energy distribution systems in which powerful 
interests are invested, and there were no innovations with respect to how to 
address citizens’ energy grievances beyond violence or short-term 
appeasement. While governments offer little that is new, citizens’ repertoires of 
protest have innovated with the rise of digital and social media, finding new ways 
of framing narratives and mobilising supporters.  
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Transnational actors are part of this landscape of energy protests, but their roles 
can be hidden or obscure. Multilateral aid actors influence subsidy reform, but 
less often through the ‘hard’ conditionality of structural adjustment than by 
shaping the intellectual agenda and policy pathways. Multinationals and foreign 
governments take a direct hand in national energy policy in the global South; 
these well-resourced powerful interests help ensure energy policymaking 
remains closed and secretive. Aid donor support for civil society and good 
governance has rarely supported popular domestic movements for climate 
justice or energy security, while transnational climate movements focus on 
cutting fossil fuel use and play no role in popular protests against energy price 
rises and scarcity in the global South. While energy price protests in the global 
South seem at odds with activism against fossil fuels in the North, both share a 
concern with the need for civic participation, transparency, and accountability in 
energy policymaking. 
There are two main policy and practice implications of this research. First, these 
protests signal that energy security is shaping up to be a wicked problem: it 
involves many competing interests, there is no ‘correct’ solution, and information 
about the issue is always incomplete (Rittel and Webber 1973). Demands for 
reliable, affordable access to fuel and energy (the definition of energy security, 
according to the International Energy Agency (IEA n.d.) will continue to rise, 
while there is increasing pressure to reduce the use of fossil fuels to minimise 
the impact on climate change. Efforts to reform fuel subsidies in the interests of 
reducing carbon emissions and improving equity have also been gathering pace, 
but subsidy reforms have proven resistant to satisfactory resolution, in part 
because of policy elite fears of mass protests against higher-priced energy. Such 
mobilisation expresses deeply felt grievances that lack other civil channels of 
expression or representation. At the same time, states appear slow or unable to 
deliver acceptable alternatives to subsidies. Governments in fragile, conflict- and 
violence-affected settings have not been able to provide legitimate and 
acceptable social protection buffers that alleviate citizens’ anger and protests 
over the costs of steep fuel prices hikes. The ‘negotiations’ between citizens and 
state are costly, often violent, and ultimately unproductive (subsidy cuts are 
stalled, public spending remains inequitable or inefficient, citizens still do not get 
the energy they need at prices they can afford). Even ‘successful’ protest 
episodes yield little or no mechanisms of accountability to citizens for energy 
policy. Civic activism around energy security is in its infancy, where found at all. 
In the three countries we studied closely, energy policy has been taken up by 
political parties/regimes, but some of the most marginalised and disempowered 
urban populations have benefited least from the politicisation of energy.  
The second key implication is that it is necessary to address institutional failures 
to hear and respond to citizens’ energy concerns. There is no guarantee that 
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improving citizen participation in energy policymaking will resolve this wicked 
problem. But enabling citizens to voice their energy grievances through non-
riotous means is an entry point to date untried in countries with large fossil fuel 
subsidies and a history of mass protest. While much donor and development 
policy and many global treaties encourage countries to transition away from 
fossil fuels, where energy is fossil dependent, the current political bargain around 
energy prices may make energy transitions contentious. A key part of the 
solution will be to come up with affordable, accessible, and sustainable energy 
distribution that moves beyond the current impasse. Governments that have 
shown willing to deploy armed forces against energy protestors are unlikely to 
willingly create spaces for citizen participation, nor do transnational actors have 
innate incentives to do so. Global food policy provides an instructive example of 
how strong social movements with national and global force have been able to 
push for and create space in food and nutrition policy processes for citizen voice. 
As energy becomes more vital to everyday life in modern cities, livelihoods and 
lives will depend ever more on access to modern forms of energy. Creating 
global and national policy space for social movements and civic activism is likely 
to be crucial for progress towards energy justice.
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1. Introduction: Why energy protests 
matter 
This paper summarises research into how and why energy protests emerge and 
escalate, whether they empower citizens to hold their governments to account 
for energy provisioning, and the role played by transnational actors in the policy 
processes associated with these protests. Research into protests against energy 
price rises and scarcity is of increasing importance because such protests have 
been frequent and potent in the twenty-first century; they signal the importance 
of energy as a matter of rights and justice. They may also block fossil fuel 
subsidy reforms, and so are of particular interest to aid agencies and activists 
campaigning for cuts. The research on which this synthesis paper is based 
centres on the perspectives of citizens and protestors, attempting to understand 
why people take to the streets en masse, and at personal risk, to protest what 
they see as unjust or unworkable energy pricing or supply policies. The research 
helps to explain why energy protests have become such an important form of 
contemporary contention; points towards the weaknesses in energy governance 
that make such contention increasingly likely; and identifies strategies for 
addressing energy contention to enable just and sustainable energy transitions 
that go beyond the technocratic policy interventions currently favoured.  
1.1 Background and motivations 
Energy transitions and green transformations are as political as they are 
technical and scientific processes (Sovacool 2012; Scoones et al. 2015; 
Sovacool et al. 2016; Newell 2021). Recent protests illustrate why: mass protests 
and movements have proven potent opponents of fossil fuel and other energy 
projects (Temper et al. 2020), and have impeded fossil fuel subsidy reforms 
(Ross et al. 2017; Lockwood 2015). People continue to protest about energy 
issues amid rising violence against, and criminalisation of, activists defending 
environmental rights (ICNL and ECNL 2020); despite the pandemic, there were 
almost a thousand separate incidents of protests related to energy in 2020.2 
Protests triggered by energy grievances escalated into far bigger struggles about 
economic and political governance in countries as varied as France, Iran, the 
Sudan, Chile and Haiti (Natalini et al. 2020; Ehrenreich 2019). Some 41 
countries experienced major episodes of fuel riots (protests that entailed violence 
and which specifically mention access to, or the affordability of, energy as the 
reason for the protest) between 2005 and 2018 (Natalini et al. 2020).  
 
2  Almost 700 protests against energy price rises and scarcity were recorded across some 32 countries in 
2020, and over a hundred against fossil fuel use or energy plants (ACLED no date).  
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These protests matter in part because they are part of a ‘rich ecology of 
resistance’ that will determine the pathways of energy transitions (Newell 2021: 
172). Activism against fossil fuel use, mostly by environmental movements 
concentrated in the global North, and protests against fuel subsidy cuts or tax 
rises, mainly in the global South, appear to counter each other, with one side 
against fossil fuels and the other fighting for their rights to use them. But this 
apparent opposition overlooks important commonalities: that people across the 
world are actively demanding to shape their energy supply, and to do so in ways 
that are just and sustainable (Newell 2021). A growing literature treats popular 
mobilisation around energy as an important feature of the landscape of climate 
change policy and energy transitions (Hanna et al. 2016), recognising that 
‘citizens worldwide are seeking more active political engagement regarding what 
their energy systems and climate futures will look like’ (Temper et al. 2020: 19; 
see also: Roddis et al. 2018). Energy justice is understood to include not only a 
fair distribution of energy use, but also procedural justice, or that people are able 
to participate in decisions about energy policy, with transparency and public 
accountability for the choices made (Jenkins et al. 2016; Jenkins et al. 2018; 
Sovacool and Dworkin 2015). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) 2018 special report on global warming of 1.5ºc found that: 
Identifying and navigating inclusive and socially acceptable pathways 
towards low-carbon, climate-resilient futures is a challenging yet 
important endeavour, fraught with moral, practical and political 
difficulties and inevitable trade-offs [which entail] deliberation and 
problem-solving processes to negotiate societal values, well-being, 
risks and resilience and to determine what is desirable and fair, and 
to whom. 
(IPCC 2018: 448–49) 
A critical challenge for climate change policy is that for many people around the 
world, protest appears to be the best means of engaging in ‘deliberation and 
problem-solving processes’ about energy policy, because it is their ‘societal 
values’ and ‘wellbeing’ which are most directly at stake. Activism against fossil 
fuel use has triggered a series of protests and larger uprisings in the past few 
years, particularly in the global North, and fossil fuel subsidy reform is now 
considered an ‘emerging global norm’ of climate change mitigation efforts 
(Skovgaard and Asselt 2019: 2). Nevertheless, the policy arguments for fossil 
fuel subsidy cuts in the global South have emphasised their fiscal – rather than 
environmental – effects; in contexts where governments have never to date 
delivered effective social protection, consumer subsidy cuts are perceived as a 
net loss of welfare (Houeland 2021). Fuel subsidy reforms have high level 
international backing, from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the Biden White House among others, but to date 
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there has been limited research into the phenomenon of protests against energy 
price rises (Natalini et al. 2020).  
The research findings synthesised here aim to improve our knowledge about 
energy protests. The starting point was not to inform climate change policies or 
fossil fuel subsidy reform agendas, but to centre protestors’ perspectives 
(Hossain et al. 2018). The Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) 
programme, of which this project was part, focused on countries where political 
authority was fragile or fragmented, and violence and conflict were endemic and 
characteristic of citizen-state relations. The prominence of energy contention, in 
the absence of other important episodes of collective action, suggested that 
fragility and conflict in some way enabled the escalation of energy protests. In 
settings where other forms of political action were proscribed, dangerous, or 
ineffectual, large collectivities had protested energy policies, sometimes facing 
violence, but occasionally succeeding in reversing policies and influencing 
political power.  
Comparable to food riots in how they dramatise grievances about basic needs, 
fuel riots draw attention to the relationship between citizens and their state, 
suggesting that how societies resolve the politics of energy provisioning may be 
formative of the citizen-state relationship (Tilly 1975). In other words, the 
research on energy protests was motivated not only by its potential to explain the 
politics of energy transitions, but also because the politics of energy transitions 
sheds light on the nature of politics more broadly, drawing attention to bigger 
questions about the nature of the relationship between citizens and the states 
mandated to ensure access to the modern forms of energy citizens need for daily 
life. In the contexts of a global climate crisis and transnational interests in energy 
and finance, the citizen-state relationship may be structured as much by 
international as national dynamics.  
With these concerns in mind, the research synthesised in this paper asked: How 
and under which conditions do struggles over energy access in fragile and 
conflict affected settings empower the powerless to hold public authorities 
to account (over energy or more broadly, over other issues)? Specifically, 
we explored:  
− How and why energy protests emerged and escalated into larger political 
contention. 
− Whether they empowered citizens to hold their governments to account 
for energy provisioning. 
− The roles of transnational actors in these struggles. 
This paper summarises findings from the mixed-method, multi-sited, comparative 
study that was designed to test relevant propositions. The study combined cross-
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country analysis of the period 2005–18 with in-depth case studies of key 
episodes in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan selected to provide a contrast of 
different energy regimes, types of protests, and political systems.  
1.2 Key findings 
The research found that protests triggered by grievances about energy acquired 
a particular potency in settings where more institutionalised and formal channels 
for expressing grievances – programmatic political parties, organised civil 
society, independent media – were absent, weak, or blocked. Nevertheless, 
energy price and scarcity protests have occurred and escalated across types of 
political and energy regimes, levels of development, and regions. While 
economic and political conditions in fragile states may create opportunities for 
such protests to escalate, the research also indicates that energy protests can 
create or contribute to political fragility, depending on how governments respond 
to them. 
Yet there was little evidence from the detailed country case studies that the raw 
power of energy protests translated into sustained empowerment of citizens with 
respect to energy policy, or more broadly, in their relations to the state.3 There is 
evidence that (political) power was perceived to have been gained by protest 
movements or by ‘the people’, broadly speaking. But the evidence also indicated 
that these gains of power could be subverted, turned to particularistic advantage, 
or subsumed within party political competition. In Pakistan, for instance, access 
to electricity was forced onto the democratic political agenda by hundreds of 
protests over what was seen as an intolerable failure of the state to provide a 
stable electricity supply; but electricity policymaking remains opaque, elitist, and 
technocratic, and no new spaces or institutional practices have given citizens 
voice over the power supply.  
Meaningful gains in citizen power after energy protests are often short-lived and 
diffused, dissipating in the absence of institutionalised mechanisms of citizen 
empowerment, or of sustained civic organisations or movements. Major protest 
episodes teach protestors that if they can come together en masse, they can 
force the government to hear their complaints about unpopular policies. This is 
important knowledge, closely shaping the likelihood of future episodes; many 
countries have repeat episodes or long-running campaigns against energy 
policies. But while energy protests sometimes bequeathed a legacy of 
movements and activist memories, in the cases examined closely, they rarely 
elicited more than a heated public hearing and produced little lasting policy 
change. In Nigeria, the 2012 episodes reinforced the threat of mass protests 
 
3  Unless, that is, they turn into broad revolutionary movements such the Sudanese Revolution of 2019, or 
the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. These rare and complex moments are the outcome of many factors, in 
which grievances about energy appeared to have played a triggering, but by no means a decisive, role. 
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against unpopular energy policies, succeeding not in pushing subsidy reform off 
the table, but in encouraging subsidy reformers to develop more tactical 
approaches to introducing reforms – timing or policing them so as to avoid or 
defuse protests. The Mozambique food and fuel protests of 2008 and 2010, for 
instance, taught the state to deploy extreme violence against protestors, to 
dampen any nascent struggles. 
The research found limited evidence that energy protests led to lasting or 
institutionalised public accountability to citizens, whether for energy or for any 
other essential public services. In the more disruptive episodes of protest, 
governments backed down on proposed price rises or introduced short-term 
fixes for electricity shortages. State tactics were to ward off protests, but rarely 
involved a visible strategy of strengthening public accountability for energy 
policy. One example is Nigeria’s Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment 
Program (SURE-P), announced six weeks before the 2012 subsidy cuts (Alleyne 
and Hussain 2013). This was a social fund designed to reinvest subsidy savings 
into social protection and investment, the board of which was to include civil 
society representatives. SURE-P ended after the government of Goodluck 
Jonathan left office, and while it aimed to provide some services, it did not 
enable citizens to determine what and how they needed to be compensated for 
the rise in fuel prices. Notably SURE-P financed infrastructure projects and some 
public works, maternal and child health programmes, and vocational training for 
unemployed youth (Alleyne and Hussain 2013); but none of these interventions 
would have compensated for the rising cost of living associated with the more 
than 100 per cent increase in fuel prices originally planned.  
The fleeting sense of power that protestors gain when they do succeed in 
mobilising merely creates a self-reinforcing cycle: protestors are persuaded it is 
all they can and must do, and governments fear the protests, but expect the 
resistance to dissipate in time. Political parties in Pakistan and Nigeria took on 
protestors’ – and the broader public’s – grievances about energy to some extent. 
But fiscal necessity still frequently compels governments to undertake fuel 
subsidy reforms, while they have little incentive to reduce corruption or 
mismanagement in existing energy distribution systems in which powerful 
interests are invested. 
Energy contention thus reveals a ‘wicked problem’: neither side is satisfied with 
the outcomes, but the tested strategies of each deepen the impasse and 
reinforce the conflict. Current strategies for subsidy reform and energy policy 
formulation offer no evident innovations with respect to how to address citizens’ 
energy grievances beyond violence or short-term appeasement. But while 
governments offer little that is new, citizens’ repertoires of protest have innovated 
with the rise of digital and social media, finding new ways of framing narratives 
and mobilising supporters.  
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Transnational actors are part of this landscape of energy protests, but their roles 
can be hidden or obscure. Multilateral aid actors influence subsidy reform, but 
less often through the ‘hard’ conditionality of the earlier structural adjustment 
period than by shaping the intellectual agenda and policy pathways. 
Multinationals and foreign governments take a direct hand in national energy 
policy in many countries in the global South; these well-resourced powerful 
interests, particularly the major fossil fuel multinationals, help ensure energy 
policymaking remains closed and secretive. Aid donor support for civil society 
and good governance appears in general to have stopped short of supporting 
popular domestic movements or civic action for climate justice or energy 
security; this is one reason why civil society channels for citizens to articulate 
and address their energy grievances are blocked. But while transnational policy 
and business actors are implicated in contention around energy in the global 
South, transnational (Northern) civil society actors play no such role in popular 
protests against energy price rises and scarcity (or energy poverty). With its 
focus on reducing fossil fuel use and carbon emissions, transnational climate 
justice activism can be thoroughly at odds with the demands for affordable 
energy by citizens in the global South, where fossil fuels are the primary source 
available. 
This paper provides conceptual, methodological, and empirical analysis of a 
phenomenon of singularly grave importance, as the world seeks to transition 
away from fossil fuel dependence. Without understanding why people protest 
against cuts to energy subsidies, there is no chance of designing lasting reforms 
that move societies towards fair energy transitions and climate justice. The 
analysis here shows that while there are no easy answers, the evidence points 
towards responses that appropriately and effectively centre people’s experiences 
as users of energy. It is clear that citizens need to be engaged in energy 
policymaking, rather than having solutions imposed upon them which will not 
stick, or if they do so, will prove neither sustainable nor just. 
1.3 About this paper 
This paper synthesises findings from one of five projects under the A4EA 
research programme, a consortium of research on fragile and conflict-affected 
settings based at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of 
Sussex. The A4EA programme explores how social and political action can 
contribute to empowerment and accountability in fragile, conflict, and violent 
settings, focused on Egypt, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan.  
The present paper draws on three country case studies, in Mozambique, Nigeria, 
and Pakistan involving mixed-methods and multi-level research, including the 
collection of data through process-tracing, literature and document review and 
key informant interviews (KIIs); construction of events catalogues using news 
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media sources; and focus group discussions (FGD) with communities involved in 
episodes of energy protest, to explore both their energy needs, and their 
experiences of energy policies and protests. The paper also integrates findings 
from a cross-national study of violent protests about energy prices and scarcity 
(or fuel riots), which explored the relationships between political and economic 
conditions, including energy production, and the prevalence and distribution of 
such episodes to date in the twenty-first century.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out our thinking about 
useful theories for making sense of energy protests and explains our 
methodological approach. Section 3 sets out findings about whether protests 
against energy price rises and scarcity are enabled by the nature of politics in 
settings where political authority is fragile, and conflict and violence characterise 
the citizen-state relationship. Section 4 explores findings about the extent to 
which energy protests empower citizens with respect to energy policy, and 
whether and how protests leave energy policy in a more accountable state. 
Section 5 examines findings about the roles of transnational actors in energy 
protests and the policy regimes that give rise to them. Section 6 concludes with a 
discussion of the research, policy, and practice implications. 
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2. Researching energy protests: 
Approaches and methodologies 
2.1 The multi-disciplinary literature on energy 
protests 
To inform the development of researchable questions and appropriate research 
methodologies, the multi-disciplinary team reviewed four bodies of literature:  
− Cross-country conflict analysis that uses regression analysis to identify 
political and economic factors correlated with protest occurrence; within 
this broad literature, the focus was on analyses of food and fuel riots 
(Berazneva and Lee 2013; Hendrix and Haggard 2015; Bellemare 2015). 
− The political economy of fossil fuel subsidies, which examines the 
interests involved in subsidy regimes (McCulloch 2017; Rentschler and 
Bazilian 2017a; Strand 2013; Victor 2009; Inchauste and Victor 2017; 
Lockwood 2015). 
− Contentious politics, in particular theoretical and methodological work 
explaining the mechanisms through which protests emerge, recur, or 
escalate (McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly 2008), some of which addresses 
contention around energy specifically (Kitschelt 1986; Plows 2008; North 
2011; Hendrix et al. 2009); contentious politics is also informed by the 
concepts and methods of social history, in particular work on the moral 
economy justifications for food riots, or popular ideas about the roles of 
public authorities during periods of dearth or price rises (Thompson 1971, 
1991; Bohstedt 2010, 2014; on the moral economy of fuel price protests, 
see Guyer and Denzer 2013). 
− Empowerment and accountability research, which defines and describes 
processes, mechanisms and indicators of empowerment and 
accountability (Batliwala 2007; Ibrahim and Alkire 2007; Kabeer 2005; 
Gaventa 2006; Gaventa and Barrett 2010; Fox 2016b, 2016a). 
Separately, these bodies of literature offer insights into aspects of energy 
protests from their different disciplinary and thematic specialisms. Our 
interdisciplinary research team knit these insights together to build the theoretical 
and methodological frameworks necessary to support our inquiry. For instance, 
cross-country conflict analysis describes the distribution and frequency of energy 
protests, theorising that people are driven to protest as fuel price rises make 
them worse off than before and because they see the removal of such subsidies 
as an abrogation of the social contract. There are parallels here with protests 
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against food price increases which appear more likely under authoritarian 
regimes, where popular discontent is fed by an absence of democratic process 
or accountability (Arezki and Bruckner 2011). But while popular discontent about 
governance is common, price changes do not automatically result in protest. For 
example, while Nigeria has experienced many fuel price protests, the subsidy 
cuts in 2016 and 2020 occurred without major protests.  
Analysis of food riots directs us to pay attention to these events not as the 
responses of the angry hungry masses, but as political acts of claims making 
(Hossain and Scott-Villiers 2017). The conditions of relative deprivation matter 
not as biological needs, but in relation to what citizens expect from their states. In 
comparable protests, researchers have found that moral economy views that 
public authorities were responsible for protecting citizens against dearth justified 
protests against food price rises (Thompson 1971, 1991; Hossain and Kalita 
2014). Modern life increasingly demands modern forms of energy for barest 
survival, so we could expect to see a comparable moral economy of energy 
emerging among energy price protests.  
Grievances and moral economy ideas alone cannot explain why protests are 
triggered in some but not other circumstances. The concept of ‘political 
opportunity structures’ offers a broad but systematic means of analysing the 
conditions underpinning protest movements, formalising the recognition that 
whether a movement emerges and has an impact is closely – and predictably – 
dependent on the incentives created by the political setting (Tarrow 2011; Meyer 
2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Political opportunity structures are: 
consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – 
dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage 
in contentious politics … [including] factors – like repression, but also 
like authorities’ capacity to present a solid front to insurgents that 
discourage contention.  
(Tarrow 2011: 20) 
These may be opportunities that signal protests may succeed in shifting political 
or public opinion, or threats that signal that protests may elicit only state violence. 
Changes in political opportunity structures – the election of more progressive 
parties or a political scandal that delegitimates the ruling class, for instance – can 
make protesting seem more worthwhile.  
Political economy analysis of fossil fuel subsidies drew our attention to the 
reasons why governments raise energy prices sharply, and to how governments 
respond to protests about energy price rises or scarcity. Governments often raise 
fuel prices sharply to cut subsidies as part of public spending reforms 
(Rentschler and Bazilian 2017b; Lockwood 2015). Fossil fuel exporting countries 
are particularly likely to have the kind of consumer price subsidies that are the 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 555 






usual object of protests, partly because they are comparatively energy-rich 
(Cheon et al. 2013; Victor 2009). In energy-rich countries where state capacity to 
distribute resources is weak, consumer fuel subsidies tend to be common and 
resilient to reform efforts (Inchauste and Victor 2017). Authoritarian and weakly 
dominant political regimes are likely to rely on such subsidy regimes as a source 
of popular legitimacy (Andresen 2008; Rosser 2006).  
Nevertheless, not all energy protests are in authoritarian or fossil fuel exporting 
regimes; state capacities and political regime types, as well as energy production 
status, vary among the countries that have recently experienced protests 
(Natalini et al. 2020). Not all countries where fossil fuel subsidies have been 
sharply cut have experienced such protests (Inchauste and Victor 2017). People 
appear to be particularly aggrieved about energy subsidy cuts where other forms 
of social protection are limited, where natural resource wealth is highly 
concentrated, or where economic performance is poor; in these circumstances, 
subsidies may come to be seen as part of the social contract (McCulloch et al. 
2020; Lockwood 2015). Reflecting on the protests that triggered the Arab 
uprisings of 2011, El-Katiri and Fattouh note that in the Middle East and North 
African region, energy subsidies are ‘widely perceived as a fundamental 
economic and social benefit’ (2017: 59), such that their withdrawal undermines 
the legitimacy of state rule.  
The localised provision of electricity has enabled research into the non-protest 
political responses to energy scarcity or price rises within polities. This indicates 
that under democratic conditions, voters reward providers of affordable 
electricity; in addition, democratic competition is seen to spur electrification 
(Ahlborg et al. 2015; Min 2015; Brown and Mobarak 2009). Unsurprisingly, given 
the choice, citizens tend to vote for power. Absent meaningful political choices, 
however, and mass protests are likely where space for civic engagement, 
independent media, organisations capable of mobilising support, and 
generalised discontent about economic conditions are present (Hossain and 
Scott-Villiers 2017). Protests often escalate into violence because of state 
repression; the nature of the state-citizen relationship, and in particular whether 
the state has the capacity, will, or means to respond to popular demands will 
also shape the likelihood of fuel riots (Tarrow 2013). 
2.2 Research questions and propositions 
From our reading of these different literatures, and from the learning from an 
initial scoping study (Hossain et al. 2018), we asked: 
How and under which conditions do struggles over energy 
access in fragile and conflict affected settings empower the 
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powerless to hold public authorities to account (over energy or 
other issues)? 
We further developed a set of research questions underpinned by specific 
propositions which we explored through the case studies and cross-country 
research: 
− Why do struggles around energy specifically appear to have the potential 
to grow into significant episodes of contention within fragile settings, and 
which features of fragility help to explain major movements or struggles 
around energy? 
− Did popular struggles over energy strengthen accountability for energy, or 
for other basic services or rights? 
− Did struggles over energy empower individuals or civic or social groups to 
influence energy policy? 
− How did transnational actors in the energy and development sectors 
impact on energy policies and protests? 
2.3 Methodology 
The study adopted a mix of methods, as suited to answering the different 
questions it asked, unpacking concepts, and refining approaches to fit the 
country cases and datasets.  
2.3.1 Country case studies 
In-depth country cases were developed in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan, 
because each had had moments of rapid price change, mass protest, and policy 
change over the past 15 years. Mozambique had experienced protests around 
fuel prices and electricity, and the case study examined both. Nigeria had had 
multiple episodes of fuel price protest, as well as instances where prices rose 
sharply, and no protest took place. Pakistan had also had hundreds of small and 
localised electricity protests in the period, and electricity policies shifted in their 
wake. In each country, research teams comprising scholars with expertise in 
contentious politics research, popular cultural and media analysis, and the 
political economy of energy undertook the following: 
− A catalogue of relevant protest events in the past decade, using digital 
and physical newspaper archives to develop a database of media 
coverage to document the timing, location, scale, and immediate effects 
of protest events. 
− FGDs with selected occupation and income groups in areas associated 
with protests; these aimed to elicit perspectives on energy needs and 
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access, perceptions of the role of government in energy provision, and the 
motivations and effects of energy price protests. Areas and groups were 
identified on the basis of findings from the events catalogue; nine FGDs 
were conducted in Lagos State in Nigeria; four FGDs were conducted in 
Lahore in Pakistan. In Mozambique, six FGDs were conducted in peri-
urban Maputo and Matola. 
− Popular cultural analysis of music, memes, cartoons etc was undertaken 
to access citizen perspectives on their concerns about energy. 
− Process tracing of key moments of energy protests and policy change, 
using secondary information and key informant interviews (KIIs) with 
officials, activists, politicians, and transnational actors (where possible). In 
each country between 15 and 20 key informants were interviewed. 
Country research plans and designs were shared with stakeholder groups in 
each country. Plans were made to ensure ethical and researcher safety 
standards were set and maintained at the appropriate levels in each context, and 
that protocols for storing and protecting data, and for anonymising names and 
places were established and used. 
2.3.2 Cross-country analysis 
This paper drew on an original database compiled on fuel riots (fuel price 
protests in which violence took place) described in (Natalini et al. 2020) and 
extended this to cover the period 2005–18. The aim was to establish more 
systematically, and across the universe of recent cases, associations between 
fuel riots and a range of socioeconomic and political factors. The paper 
combined fuel riot data with monthly data on domestic fuel prices and tested 
different social and political variables proxying for varying citizen-state 
relationships to identify the most important underlying factors associated with 
fuel riots. A total of 59 distinct episodes (encompassing all such events in a 
single year in a single country) were identified and analysed. 
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3. Fragility and the escalation of 
energy protests 
Are energy protests more likely to escalate in fragile settings? Which (if any) 
features of fragility best help explain major episodes of struggle around energy? 
The research studied: a) whether fragile and conflict affected political systems 
featured more frequent or significant energy protests (compared to more stable 
or peaceful settings); b) views on the part of energy provisioning within the social 
contract in fragile settings; c) whether subsidy regimes faced fiscal pressure 
domestically and/or external pressure from austerity reforms, and; d) whether in 
settings featuring major energy protests, citizens enjoyed formal political and 
civic space for popular engagement with energy policies, or if they were blocked 
from such participation. 
3.1 Are major energy protests more common in 
fragile settings? 
3.1.1 Cross-country analysis of fuel riots 
We aimed to understand whether fragile and violent political systems were more 
likely to create political opportunity structures in which protestors had incentives 
to protest about energy. To explore this, we undertook a cross-country analysis 
of fuel riots, or price-triggered episodes which featured violence.4 There were 
several reasons to believe that major energy protests or fuel riots would be more 
likely in some kinds of fragile settings, particularly those endowed with 
exportable energy resources and characterised by a ‘natural resource curse’ (or 
governance arrangements intended to protect elite access to such wealth, at the 
cost of broader development) (Rosser 2006). Authoritarian regimes are more 
likely than democracies to offer fuel subsidies (Kim and Urpelainen 2016: 552), 
which are believed to quell or pre-empt social unrest (Victor 2009). Energy-rich 
countries are particularly likely to have the kind of consumer price subsidies that 
fuel price protests target (Cheon et al. 2013; Victor 2009); weak state capacity to 
distribute resources ensures that consumer fuel subsidies are common and 
resilient to reform efforts (Inchauste and Victor 2017). Finally, authoritarian and 
weakly dominant political regimes are particularly likely to rely on such subsidy 
regimes as a source of popular legitimacy (Andresen 2008; Rosser 2006).  
 
4  Protest episodes were included if media coverage indicated that physical violence of some kind 
occurred, and if there was clear evidence that energy pricing was a core grievance. 
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Major energy protests tend to become more or less common in line with the 
international oil price (Natalini et al. 2020). We explored relationships between 
different energy regimes, political systems, and major fuel protest episodes using 
a purpose-built dataset covering 2005–18. We found that countries with fixed 
price regimes – and therefore high energy subsidies – were twice as likely as 
countries with flexible price regimes – i.e., countries without high energy 
subsidies – to have experienced fuel riots since 2005. This period saw significant 
fluctuations in fuel prices, so that countries with large fuel subsidies faced fiscal 
or external pressures to increase prices; these would have been deeply 
unpopular at moments when other costs of living were also rising. Net fuel 
exporters were more likely to have fixed price regimes and to experience violent 
fuel protests than other countries, consistent with the literature showing that 
energy-rich countries have more consumer fuel subsidies, and often lack the 
state capacity to distribute resources through other policy instruments.  
Figure 3.1 Fuel riots around the world, 2005–19 
Source: Authors’ own, created with MapChart, CC BY-SA 4.0 
While sudden price rises were the single greatest trigger for major fuel protests, 
the political conditions associated with fuel riots were varied. Fuel riots were not 
found to be closely associated with regime type. However, fuel riots were more 
common in countries with higher corruption, and less common in countries that 
scored well for government effectiveness and the rule of law, as well as control 
over territory. When controlling for other factors that might influence the 
likelihood of fuel riots, countries with greater civil society freedom were found to 
have fewer fuel riots, suggesting that if polities have channels for citizens to 
express grievances, citizens may be less likely to resort to protest to resist 
unpopular policy changes. Further, we found that countries where significant 
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anti-system movements exist are much more likely to have fuel riots. This 
supports the idea that riots are not necessarily spontaneous eruptions of anger 
but are supported by opposition groups that leverage public anger against price 
rises as an opportunity to discredit or damage the government.  
3.1.2 Mechanisms of escalation: Energy protests in Mozambique, Nigeria, 
and Pakistan 
While aspects of state fragility are associated with the emergence of significant 
protests triggered by energy contention, we need to understand the mechanisms 
through which protests about energy escalate from protests into broader 
struggles.5 From contentious politics theories, we can draw on the concept of 
‘scale-shift’ or ‘change in the number and level of coordinated contentious 
actions to a different focal point, involving a new range of actors, different 
objects, and broadened claims’ (McAdam et al. 2001: 331). 
To identify the mechanisms that turn a protest into an episode of political rupture 
entails analysing the moments at which specific local grievances are transformed 
into broader complaints. The shift in scale we are interested in here is vertical 
and horizontal – a form of ‘contentious politics that expand outward and upward 
from the local level to the state, federal, or transnational level’ (Soule 2013: 2). 
Such shifts would not be possible without mass popular support, and so imply in 
addition a process of ‘diffusion’ or  
that some element of a social movement (e.g., tactic, frame, 
ideology, protest, repertoire, campaign) is spreading across some 
set of actors (e.g., organizations, networks, groups, people, 
communities, states) in a social system either through direct or 
indirect networks of communication. 
(Soule 2013: 1) 
To explore the mechanisms through which energy protests experience scale 
shift, we sketch the main episodes in each country in which protests about 
energy prices escalated into more substantial complaints about corruption, 
collusion, and the failures of economic and political governance. We look at how 
grievances and collective action diffused across different groups and regions. 
This overview of the protests and their framing narratives, also identifies the 
networks through which narratives and tactics were diffused.  
 
5  The cross-country work used a definition of fuel riots that included that the event had to feature violence. 
In the country case studies, the focus was not on fuel riots but on the broader category of energy-related 
protests. 
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Mozambique has seen explosive episodes of popular mobilisation in 2008, 2010 
and 2012, in which protesters have voiced anger not only at the rising cost of 
urban transport, electricity and food but also at growing inequality and corruption 
(de Brito et al. 2017). See Annexe 1 Table A1 Protest episodes in Mozambique, 
2008–20 and Error! Reference source not found. for more detail. These 
revolts spread beyond Maputo, although they were concentrated in the 
metropolitan area of Greater Maputo, including the satellite city of Matola, 
comprising together about two million people. Greater Maputo is highly unequal; 
its visible wealth pockets are surrounded by large concentrations of people living 
in poverty. In recent years many of these peri-urban zones have been 
transformed by the growth of bairros de expansão (expansion neighbourhoods) 
in which upwardly-mobile households seeking more living space but priced out of 
the central areas have moved in alongside poorer traditional residents, bringing 
with them higher expectations in terms of services and infrastructure. Maputo 
has higher levels of education and rates of computer, internet or cell phone 
access than the rest of Mozambique and features a strong perception among 
many ‘of being ‘captured’ in poverty, and not being able to take part in what the 
city has to offer, is at the heart of current dissatisfaction among poor people in 
Maputo’s poor bairros’ (Tvedten et al. 2013: 4). 
In early 2008, the Mozambican government increased the price of fuel to offset 
higher costs of imported oil. Private passenger transport vehicles (known as 
chapa) increased fares by up to 50 per cent. The price of bread also rose by 12.5 
per cent. Text messages circulated calling for a ‘greve’ or strike, and on 5 
February a wave of violent popular protests erupted, blocking main roads with 
improvised barricades, and burning tyres, looting shops (particularly of food), and 
burning or stoning vehicles. The riots paralysed Maputo and Matola for three 
days. The protests ended when the decision was taken to keep transport fares 
unchanged, after the government negotiated compensatory benefits with the 
chapa operators, notably removing the 17 per cent value added tax on diesel.  
On 1 and 2 September 2010, text messages again circulated calling for a greve, 
triggering a second major outbreak of street protests, this time about an increase 
in the government-controlled price of bread and other basic goods and services, 
including electricity, after prices of food and fuel had already risen sharply. 
Similar patterns of violence to February 2008 were seen, this time with ten 
deaths and hundreds of people injured, and extensive damage. As in 2008, the 
government reversed its decisions, froze prices, and announced new subsidies, 
among other measures. In the protests of 2008 and 2010, some two-dozen 
people were killed, including two children, and over 500 people were injured. 
On 15 and 16 November 2012, Maputo was paralysed again, this time for a day 
and a half due to the threat of riots following an announced increase in transport 
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fares. However, the patterns of violence seen in 2008 and 2010 did not recur. 
Mobile phone communications were restricted, and heavy policing at critical 
points of the city prevented escalation. There have been no major recurrences of 
energy protests since 2012. Instead, a pattern has emerged of localised protests 
both over electricity costs and service failures, and over transport costs (with the 
latter often led by chapa operators themselves when compensation schemes fail 
to cover the cost of rising fuel prices), that are stifled before they can spread. In 
recent years, the government has sought to head off larger-scale protest through 
a combination of smaller but more frequent price increases, investments in public 
transport (running cheaper public buses on some crowded chapa routes) and 
improving the speed with which the electricity utility Electricidade de 
Moçambique (EDM) responds to local complaints about service failures.  
Several features of the scale shift that took place in the 2010 protests in 
Mozambique stand out. Such moments are rare in a dominant-party state with 
an over-developed apparatus for repression. The year 2010 marked a moment 
of acute crisis for low-income urban Mozambicans in particular, when the cost of 
food, transport, and electricity all increased substantially. The triggers were a 
combination of factors that together amounted to a subsistence crisis for many: 
energy prices were one of several grievances, each of individual importance. 
This broader sense of subsistence crisis shifted into a complaint about political 
and economic governance. As one interviewee told de Brito et al.: 
it was a government of intransigent, intolerant individuals who had 
nothing to do with the cause of the people or with democracy, 
because one of the pillars of democracy is full respect for human 
rights. The right to health and the right to food are part of human 
rights.  
(de Brito et al. 2017: 166) 
Messages about protests were diffused through short messaging service (SMS) 
messages and popular tunes like Azagaia’s (2008) ‘Povo no poder/Power to the 
people’, which accused the president and his ministers of failing to notice ‘that 
life’s not easy here’, warning that ‘If the police are violent/We’ll respond with 
violence’, for which the public prosecutor summoned him to answer questions 
related to possible incitement to violence.6 The government introduced mobile 
phone subscriber identity module (SIM) registration and cancelled prepaid 
arrangements, to limit the diffusion of protest. Similar price rises and grievances 
in 2012 did not lead to protests on the same scale, as protestors weighed up the 
benefits of protesting, against the repression they would likely face. When larger 
hikes in electricity and fuel prices were again introduced in 2017 in a context 
where food prices were also rising sharply, individual transport operators 
 
6  As published in the weekly newspaper Savana, 3 September 2010 (our translation). 
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mobilised and calls for a greve circulated on social media, but the chapa owners’ 
organisation disowned the protest and a heavy security presence (including 
armoured cars parked at major transit points) dissuaded citizens from taking to 
the streets. Smaller, more localised protests about energy continue – particularly 
in relation to electricity – but never taking the national stage as in 2008 and 2010. 
3.1.4 Nigeria 
While Nigeria has had multiple episodes of energy-related protests, the two 
weeks of protests, (including both violence and disruption as well as peaceful 
stay-at-home strikes) between 3 and 16 January 2012 remain the single most 
significant episode. When the government suddenly ended the fuel subsidy, 
increasing the price of fuel from N65 to N140 per litre (in 2021 prices, US$0.17 to 
US$0.36), street protests erupted in various parts of the country. The president 
was accused of unilaterally imposing the hike without consultation, in a 
clandestine attempt to enrich corrupt officials and market actors. Before the 
Goodluck Jonathan government scrapped the subsidy, there had been claims of 
widespread corruption and mismanagement in the oil sector (Okonjo-Iweala 
2018), but while the government admitted that a powerful clique had taken 
advantage of the oil subsidy scheme, it acted to remove the fuel subsidy rather 
than tackle the corruption.  
The labour unions warned that their members would protest if the government 
decision was not rescinded. Their leadership legitimised and energised ongoing 
civil society-led protests (see Houeland 2018 for close analysis of Nigerian trade 
union leadership of fuel price protests over the decades). With the trade unions, 
social media activists and other media coverage, the protests quickly 
internationalised by sending solidarity messages to the international labour 
movement and diaspora Nigerians, some of whom protested outside the World 
Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) premises in Washington DC. At its 
peak, tens of thousands of protestors were on the streets across the country, 
including around Lagos, and in Kaduna, Benin City, and Kano. These protests 
included a nationwide strike by millions of trade union members. The superstar 
musician Fela Kuti’s son, Seun Kuti, came out in support, marching shirtless 
among protestors and speaking at protest rallies. Riot police beat people with 
batons before firing into the air as the crowd, angered by the beatings, surged 
forward. Protestors marched with placards reading: ‘ “Soon the poor will have 
nothing left to eat but the rich”. T-shirts were emblazoned with “Kill corruption not 
Nigerians” ’ (Hossain et al. 2018: 27). According to one protestor:  
This government is supposed to be there to protect us, to allow us to 
make business, to feed and clothe and educate our children, and 
now they are here shooting us,’ said David Amosu, a civil servant 
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who joined one rally in Lagos.  
(Pflanz 2012) 
The unions came out in support of the protests, but attempted to curtail the 
violence: 
One union leader described the federal government's hugely 
unpopular move as ‘immoral and politically suicidal’ and urged 
Nigerians to resist ‘with everything they have’. But … once 
unleashed, the pent-up anger of the masses could be hard to curtail. 
Angry crowds vandalised gas stations, intimidated owners into 
keeping their pumps unused and assaulted a soldier, showing how 
easily the fragile peace in Africa's most populous nation could spiral 
into chaos. One young man threw jerrycans of engine oil off the 
racks at a gas station and tried to damage the station's gas pumps. 
After union leader and chairman of the Joint Action Front, Dipo 
Fashina, asked the young man to stop vandalising the station, he 
did, but later started one of the first bonfires of the protest in the 
middle of the highway.  
(Alamba and Ibukun 2012) 
Some 15 people in the end lost their lives during the 2012 protests.  
Although energy protests are not unusual in Nigeria as they are in Mozambique, 
the scale of the protests in 2012 was unprecedented. One recent study has 
explained its scale and significance in relation to the combination of an extended 
period of democracy and oil-led growth on the one hand, and the absence of 
broader social participation in the benefits of that wealth and the rise of new 
social actors on the other (Houeland 2020). Protests around fuel subsidy 
removal have a long history but were never as widespread or violent before or 
since 2012. A critical factor was that the 2012 struggle brought together many 
different actors. Whereas protests and civic action in Nigeria are often divided 
across religions or communities, the 2012 protests appeared to be spontaneous, 
widespread, and uniting people across class and other groups, bringing union 
and civil society activists behind a common grievance; in this respect, these 
2012 protests were like other fuel price protests in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Houeland 2018).  
As the fuel price rises became connected to charges of corruption, the opposition 
party became active, addressing crowds, sometimes supporting protests. The 
atmosphere was friendly (until the police and army started beating and firing at 
people), with people playing football in the street and being entertained by 
famous singers. Popular music and social media memes created and transmitted 
a common sense of grievance. It was also marked by young people using social 
media to spread grievances and protests across the country (where in the past it 
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would have been concentrated in the southeast). Since 2012, online activism 
has been increasingly energetic, but while more frequent, protests have been 
generally small.7 
3.1.5 Pakistan 
Pakistan witnessed some 456 protests between 2007 and 2015 related to 
electricity supply, access, and pricing. Of these, roughly 10 per cent formed part 
of a larger protest episode, of which the research identified four major moments. 
One episode, from 12 to 19 June 2012 in the Punjab, stands out because of the 
scale of the violence, and the deaths of 10 people. It elevated the electricity crisis 
to a position of political primacy for citizens and public authorities. By 2013, 
citizens reported electricity outages as their number one concern, over the wave 
of Islamist militancy and terrorism that began in 2005. 
Some of the most violent protests (between 2010 and 2013) took place in the 
wealthy and politically competitive regions of North and Central Punjab. The 
June 2012 protest episode was characterised by extensive economic and social 
disruption around the country: at least seven properties belonging to electricity 
sector companies were ransacked in different cities, and police vehicles were 
torched in Kamalia and Rawalpindi. The main north-south national highway near 
Toba Tek Singh, Punjab, was blocked for three days, and police and security 
guard action led to the death of two individuals. Major market and industrial 
associations carried out ‘shutter-down’ strikes, ending economic activity during 
this period.  
An important point to note here is the cross-sectional nature of the protesting 
public, which enhanced its political salience. The protests were not just 
populated by political activists or workers but were planned and coordinated by 
sections of the urban business classes, in particular traders, merchants, 
shopkeepers, and other bazaar-based actors. Data from the events catalogue 
highlights that traders and associated business segments were the second most 
frequent segment involved in electricity related contention. Urban political 
economy accounts of contemporary Pakistan, such as those by Akhtar (2018) 
and Javed (2017), identify traders and associated business segments as a 
politically salient demographic, given their role in financing political activity, and 
their status as local community leaders. Furthermore, opposition parties were 
quick to capitalise on public anger as it gave them a chance to demonstrate their 
representative credentials with key urban demographics. 
Pakistan’s case study differed from protests driven by fuel price contention, but 
resembled electricity protests in Mozambique in that public authorities reacted 
with repression on relatively few occasions. Out of 242 protests where public 
 
7  Until the 2020 #EndSARS movement, which centred on police brutality. 
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authority responses were recorded, only 8 per cent saw police using force. 
These 8 per cent included the protests (such as those in October 2011 and June 
2012) where government infrastructure and private property of politicians 
associated with the ruling party was damaged. The most common outcome (~42 
per cent) was protracted negotiations between protestors and local electricity 
officials, mediated by the police and district administration, to limit unscheduled 
outages. These were mostly cases where outage problems were contained, and 
protests did not spread. 
An important reason for lower levels of police action is the political dynamic 
between 2008 and 2013. The parties of the federal government and the Punjab 
took opposing views over when to clamp down on protests, and policing is a 
provincial responsibility. Interviews with political representatives and officials 
hinted that urgency for police action only kicked in with the threat of damage to 
private property, while road blockages were tacitly allowed to allow protestors to 
vent. The research uncovered that the police were reluctant to repress protestors 
due to shared circumstances: police faced the same electricity shortages and 
empathised with citizen anger. The local administration would often use informal 
ties with businessmen and political leaders to use their leverage to request 
protestors to dissipate. Formal action was normally used in the last resort, and 
only after explicit political approval had been granted by the provincial 
government.  
As with the major episodes in Mozambique and Nigeria, in Pakistan, new 
alliances and widely shared grievances helped sustain and escalate the protests, 
which were also supported by political opposition groups. Social media and a 
relatively free and open mass media helped to diffuse the protests, but a critical 
factor compared to Mozambique and Nigeria and to other protests in Pakistan, 
was the relative restraint of the police, partly the result of the dynamics of political 
competition. The restraint and tacit sympathies of the police enabled the 
struggles to continue over time. 
3.2 Affordable energy as part of the social contract 
Modern forms of energy are becoming an important part of everyday life, 
particularly in urban areas in the three case study countries. Provisioning 
remains uneven across and within countries, and access to electricity and 
cooking fuels has improved slowly over the past 20 years in the three case study 
countries (see Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference 
source not found.). Pakistan provides a higher proportion of its population with 
electricity and improved cooking fuels than either Nigeria or Mozambique, but 
Mozambique has made rapid progress on electricity provision.  
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Figure 3.2 Access to electricity in Mozambique, 










Source: Authors’ own, based on World Development Indicators (accessed 23 April 2020) 
Energy features in different ways in the social contract between citizens and their 
states, reflecting in part how those states are situated in energy markets. As 
Error! Reference source not found. shows, the countries have widely varying 
relationships to fuel markets, with Nigeria notable for the dominance of oil in its 
overall exports. Fuel exports have grown significantly in Mozambique in recent 
years, while Pakistan continues to rely extensively on fuel imports, as a non-oil 
producing country.  
Figure 3.3 Fuel imports and exports: Mozambique, 
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Source: Authors’ own, based on World Development Indicators (accessed 26 July 2021) 
Note: Fuels comprise the commodities in standard international trade classification section 3 (mineral fuels, 
lubricants, and related materials) 
We know that the possession of natural resource wealth plays some role in the 
way energy is treated in the social contract. Consumer subsidies serve as 
primary forms of social protection in countries with natural resource wealth 
and/or limited state capacity to distribute other resources (see El-Katiri and 
Fattouh 2017; Inchauste and Victor 2017; Lockwood 2015). By a social contract 
we do not necessarily mean a constitutional commitment or even a specific 
political promise to provide affordable energy. Instead, we use the concept to 
refer to popular political beliefs or commonly held ideas about the basis of rule. 
For affordable energy to be seen as part of the social contract, people would 
need to expect actions by their state to ensure energy access as a bare 
minimum, and the state may lose legitimacy should it fail to meet those 
expectations.  
Energy may feature in social contracts in highly specific ways, as when the 
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entitlement on the grounds of national energy wealth. This is a kind of resource 
nationalism, or: 
a political discourse, applied to political and economic thinking about 
how a state and its population should manage and distribute profits 
derived from natural resources … resource nationalism may also be 
understood in terms of collective belonging expressed through the 
idiom of natural resources. It is, in other words, one means by which 
the imagined community of the nation is constructed.  
(Koch and Perreault 2019: 611–12) 
In Nigeria, resource nationalism includes a view that affordable fuel is the 
principal claim Nigerians make on their state; its value is not only that it keeps 
living costs lower than without a subsidy, but also that it signals respect for the 
citizen-state relationship. As one Nigerian scholar of the political economy of fuel 
explained: 
It has become basically a cultural and political issue where Nigerians 
believe since we have petroleum and as government does not give 
us anything other than cheap fuel, let’s hold them to account on the 
basis that citizens want cheap fuel … emotionally, citizens feel the 
only thing they benefit from government is petrol.  
(KII 9, Nigeria) 
It bears repeating that fuel subsidy cuts signal not only the material fact that fuel 
prices and the cost of living will rise, but also that the government is not listening 
to the people – they are both an economic and a political failure.  
In Mozambique, resource nationalism also featured in how people viewed their 
relationship to energy, notably to the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric dam, owned 
by the erstwhile imperial power Portugal until 2007, when the government of 
President Armando Emílio Guebuza (who was subsequently implicated in a 
massive illegal debt and corruption scandal) bought the Mozambican state a 
controlling share. The slogan ‘Cahora Bassa é Nossa’ [Meaning; ‘Cahora Bassa 
is Ours’] is now often used ironically in social media, to point out that national 
ownership of the dam has not improved electricity access for Mozambicans – 
although elites are understood to have benefited. ‘Cahora Bassa’ is also used as 
a slang term for the illegal electricity connections to which many residents of 
Maputo and Matola resort when they have been unable to secure a connection 
to the grid and/or when prices rise out of their reach.  
The country’s vast reserves of natural gas have not generated a comparable 
popular expectation that domestic cooking gas will become more affordable. This 
is seen as a possibility for the future, contrasting with a current reality in which 
most of the gas produced by South African energy firm SASOL in Southern 
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Mozambique is exported via pipeline direct to South Africa, while plans for the 
development of the Cabo Delgado gas fields in Northern Mozambique 
emphasise exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Asia rather than making it 
available for industrial or domestic use in Maputo. This contrasts powerfully with 
the local situation in Cabo Delgado, where since 2017, frustrated expectations of 
job creation and economic development have fuelled a rapidly spreading Islamist 
insurgency, and the resulting violence has now displaced over half a million 
people and forced multinational energy companies such as TOTAL to abandon 
construction work on their LNG facilities.   
The Pakistan case study offers an alternative perspective on the role of energy in 
the social contract. Pakistan is not an energy exporter but the extension of grid 
electricity has historically been a signal of the government’s developmental 
commitment and credentials (Naqvi 2011). In FGDs in working-class Chungi 
Amer Sidhu in Lahore, respondents said the state was responsible for providing 
electricity at a ‘fair price’ and that failure to do so amounted to a failure of 
governance. One respondent explained: ‘if the hakoomat (government) is not 
ensuring that our fans stay on during the summer months, what good is it?’. 
Meeting citizens’ energy needs involves subsidies, because the cost of 
generation exceeds the price charged to consumers. The twin dynamic of 
expectations of the state obligation to supply, and the role of subsidies in ensuring 
that obligation within existing systems, underlies the mechanisms through which 
subsidies are connected to escalations of energy struggles in Pakistan.  
Our country case studies generally supported the view that subsidies and/or 
affordable access to energy are seen as citizens’ rights, part of the social 
contract governing citizen-state relations. At the same time, FGDs uncovered a 
clear and firm sense that some forms of energy were deemed essential for 
everyday life, so that the denial of energy needs amounted also to a denial of the 
right to work or eat.  
Subsidies were never explicitly framed as a substitute for, or in lieu of, social 
protection – at least until they were cut or removed – at which point their 
contribution to keeping everyday life affordable became clear. People in each of 
these three countries described the painful adjustments they had to make when 
energy prices rose, indicating that the vital nature of modern forms of energy to 
everyday life means energy is seen as a right, central to human wellbeing in the 
same way as food, water, or clean air. Nevertheless, the extent of material 
hardship people face when subsidies are cut is not the sole determinant of 
whether they protest, or whether those protests escalate.  
While certain kinds of fragility, including the political economy conditions that give 
rise to fixed price energy regimes, are associated with escalated energy protests, 
contention over energy also creates fragility in settings otherwise deemed stable; 
events in France and Chile in 2019 are the clearest examples of this. One 
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implication is that as energy becomes ever more fundamental to daily life, even 
strong governments that are otherwise viewed as accountable may struggle to 
meet energy demands in ways citizens view as acceptably fair or affordable.  
3.3 Subsidy regimes under pressure 
We expected subsidy regimes to face pressure to reform, mainly from 
multilateral agencies. We found that protests tended to escalate at times when 
subsidies were under fiscal pressure, often arising from the inefficiencies and/or 
corruption arising from the administration of the subsidies themselves. However, 
findings about the role of the IMF or other multilateral agencies in subsidy reform 
efforts were inconclusive; while there may have been more direct influence in the 
past (see for instance Houeland 2021), contemporary sources of influence 
appear to be indirect rather than through more overt conditionalities.  
In Nigeria, insurgency in the Niger Delta and fluctuating global prices of oil 
exports and fuel imports created macroeconomic instability and fiscal pressure 
on a state with weak revenue-raising abilities (Gelb and Mukherjee 2019). 
Corruption and lack of transparency in the administration of the subsidy 
programme have imposed additional fiscal costs, exacerbated by large-scale fuel 
smuggling to neighbouring countries (Galiana and Sopinka 2014). Between 2006 
and 2018, Nigeria spent N10tn (US$26bn) on subsidies, almost double the entire 
health budget (BudgIT 2019).  
Evidence of corruption has also added to pressure for subsidy reforms in Nigeria: 
in December 2011, subsidy payments were over 900 per cent more than the 
appropriated budget (US$7bn as opposed to the budgeted US$642m). More 
than 20 companies involved in the subsidy scam that was uncovered after a 
public outcry still face criminal charges for receiving hugely inflated subsidy 
claims.8 A total of NGN382bn (US$1bn) was lost to the subsidy scandal (BudgIT 
2019: 8). Other sources of pressure on the subsidy regime include devaluation of 
the Naira and rises in the price of imported fuel, both of which increase the outlay 
on subsidies (BudgIT 2019). Suspicion of multilateral agencies in Nigeria dates 
to structural adjustment, and opposition actors and the labour movement have 
 
8  The inquiry into what is widely known as the ‘subsidy scam’ covered subsidy payments over the period 
2009–11, led by the former chair of the parliamentary finance committee. The inquiry found fraud and 
mismanagement; subsidy claims for products not delivered; overcharging of the government by oil 
marketers; requisition of foreign exchange for imports of refined products, with the foreign exchange 
diverted to other uses; unauthorised deductions by the NNPC to itself; and government mismanagement 
(Okonjo-Iweala 2018). The estimated daily consumption of gasoline was 35m litres, but 59m litres of fuel 
subsidies were paid, suggesting that potentially as much as 24m litres a day of subsidised gasoline was 
being smuggled out. Government officials ignored the Petroleum Subsidy Fund (PSF) guidelines, due 
mainly to corruption and, in some cases, incompetence. A total of NGN1.067tn (US$6.8bn) was 
estimated to have been misappropriated as subsidy payments. This initial inquiry was derailed by a 
bribery scandal involving the chair of the inquiry committee, but a subsequent presidential committee 
arrived at similar conclusions, concluding that NGN382bn (US$2.5bn) was fraudulent or questionable 
and should be recovered (FOSTER 2020). 
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blamed the IMF for austerity measures and subsidy cuts. A visit to Nigeria by the 
IMF Director Christine Lagarde and the appointment of former World Bank 
Managing Director Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as Nigerian finance minister in 2011 
raised suspicion about the role of multilateral agencies in pushing for fuel 
subsidy cuts. Supporters of the Occupy Nigeria movement staged protests at the 
IMF offices in Washington DC in 2012 to highlight this presumed role, indicating 
that the legacy of the IMF helps political actors resist or even mobilise against 
reforms, regardless of its actual or direct role. 
In Pakistan, the electricity crisis started in 2007: the oil price shock and 
stagnating economic growth reduced fiscal space to pay the tariff differential 
subsidy needed to keep generating electricity. Successive governments 
struggled to increase revenues and exports to pay for energy related imports. 
These two trends have culminated in spiralling fiscal and current account deficits 
and repeated bailouts by the IMF. In 2019, the country went for its 11th IMF 
programme in 30 years on the back of yet another balance of payments crisis. 
Successive IMF programmes have advocated rationalising electricity related 
subsidies to bring down fiscal deficits and create alternative mechanisms of 
social protection in energy markets. The IMF and other donors continue to argue 
for improved transmission and distribution governance as the primary reform 
thrust, so that losses can be reduced, recovery rates improved, and overall cost 
of electricity goes down. They also advocate for the privatisation of distribution 
companies, which electricity sector labour unions continue to oppose. Anaemic 
growth and a weak revenue effort coincided with the global recession and oil 
price shock during 2007–15 to squeeze the state’s ability to pay electricity 
subsidies. The resulting outages contributed to pre-existing fragility by causing a 
4 per cent loss to gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and by escalating public 
anger, leading to widespread mobilisation and periodic outbreaks of violence. 
In Mozambique, bilateral and multilateral agencies tend to be cautious in 
negotiating with government over electricity prices and fuel subsidies because of 
the possibility of violent repression of protests, but they nonetheless have an 
influence. This influence had been significantly reduced after many bilateral 
donors withdrew budget support in the wake of the 2016 ‘hidden debt’ scandal, 
with the government resisting calls for greater transparency in the expectation 
that gas revenues (including from deals with energy companies from the donor 
countries) would reduce its donor dependency. This expectation has been 
frustrated as declining gas prices and the worsening insurgency in Cabo 
Delgado have led to the postponement or cancellation of investment decisions, 
and as a result the government has found itself needing to turn once again to the 
international financial institutions. The IMF and World Bank are known to push 
for subsidy reform but are not considered by citizens to be responsible for the 
rising prices of electricity and transport fuel. Bilateral donors tend to be most 
active in the off-grid solar sector (through programmes such as the UK aid 
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funded BRILHO programme), with only USAID taking on a high-visibility role in 
pushing for liberalisation of the electricity sector and regulatory reform.  
3.4 Space for citizen participation in energy policy 
One finding is the elite, technocratic, and untransparent nature of energy 
policymaking: decisions are made in closed rooms, by powerful actors who often 
have transnational links. Energy policy had become an important issue for 
political parties in the wake of mass protests in each of the countries; this had 
shifted some policy action from technocratic and bureaucratic towards political 
spaces (see also Houeland 2020).  
In Nigeria, we identified no effective institutions through which citizen concerns 
could be articulated for redress: political parties play little role in aggregating or 
articulating citizens’ energy grievances, although trade unions are often called in 
to negotiate on behalf of fuel protestors. During the energy crises under the 
citizen government of Obasanjo in 2003, a committee was set up that eventually 
metamorphosed into the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Authority 
(PPPRA). The PPPRA comprised 26 interest groups and stakeholders such as 
labour, oil, and transport workers unions. However, fuel price rises are not 
always discussed at PPPRA board meetings before being imposed.  
In Pakistan, electricity sector governance remains in the hands of the federal 
government bureaucracy, international donors, and top elected officials. There is 
little to no parliamentary or citizen oversight of decision making about the 
guaranteed returns offered to private electricity producers, tariff setting, subsidy 
outlay, or other aspects of sector reform. KIIs highlighted the insular nature of 
policymaking, popular frustration with these processes, and people’s reliance on 
bribery or personal relationships to resolve electricity supply problems. When 
direct influence fails, communities tend to leverage elected representatives to 
bargain on their behalf. A 2020 report on financial practices within Pakistan’s 
electricity sector governance uncovered the lucrative contracts between private 
power producers and the government, and the failure of regulatory oversight to 
ensure efficiency, suggesting rent-seeking relationships between different 
business, bureaucratic, and political elites linked to the sector. People reported 
believing the electricity sector is rife with muk muka [Meaning; ‘reciprocal 
corruption’], while FGDs revealed citizens’ sense of disempowerment with 
respect to energy decision making. 
In Mozambique, there are no institutions to channel citizen complaints into the 
regulation of fuel prices. The Mozambican Federation of Public Transport 
Owners (FEMATRO – Federação Moçambicana das Associações dos 
Transportadores Rodoviários), lobbies for tariff increases and negotiates with the 
government over compensatory subsidies whenever there is a fuel price rise. 
Accountability for urban transport costs in Maputo is confused by the fact that 
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municipalities regulate the chapa fleets while a provincial-level agency runs 
government buses and central government sets the fuel price. The parastatal 
EDM communicates tariff changes to users, chiefly through television 
advertisements. A team dedicated to community outreach is geared towards 
avoiding sabotage to EDM’s infrastructure and electricity theft, communicating 
through community leaders and Guezi, a theatre group of former EDM workers; 
however, these are not channels to communicate citizens’ grievances back to 
EDM. Since 2017, the Autoridade Reguladora de Energia (ARENE – Energy 
Regulatory Authority) is responsible for setting electricity prices but has no 
capacity for communications or mechanisms for citizen participation.  
In the past decade, Mozambican political parties have engaged with popular 
concerns about energy. The ruling party Frelimo publicised its World Bank 
funded programme ‘Energy for All’, with its 2019 election campaign featuring 
promises to extend electricity access. Opposition parties are also addressing 
energy concerns: when in October 2020, EDM announced plans to increase 
electricity tariffs by 10 per cent in 2021, the new urban-based opposition party, 
Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) demanded the plans be reversed. 
Overall, civil society engagement with the energy sector is embryonic, and there 
are no platforms for civic engagement with the state. Civil society actors 
undertake research and advocacy on energy issues but have limited connections 
with communities. Researchers have suggested that the protests of 2008 and 
2010 revealed an ‘incapacity of the political system to guarantee a genuine 
space for negotiating the social interests of the poorest strata of society’ (de Brito 
et al. 2014: 27); civil society similarly lacks a history of mobilisation around 
energy resources. Citizens increasingly turn to popular culture and social media 
to express energy grievances. 
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4. Energy protests, empowerment, 
and accountability 
Do protests empower protestors to hold public authorities accountable for energy 
(or other public services)? The findings indicate that despite the noise and fury, 
and the very public and widespread criticism of the authorities signalled by major 
protest episodes, there is limited evidence that protesting publics were 
empowered by their struggles, beyond the fleeting sense of power that collective 
action can bestow. We found equally limited evidence that the protests increased 
accountability for energy policy or provisioning, beyond some placatory 
responses intended to defuse protests rather than to address grievances. Some 
groups worst affected by unaffordable or inaccessible energy, in particular rural 
people, women and the poorest, were not visible in protests, nor were they the 
main beneficiaries of any concessions won beyond short-term gains. We 
identified neither autonomous citizen organisations capable of advocating on 
their own behalf, nor institutionalised mechanisms for including citizens or civil 
society groups in energy policymaking. To the extent that political parties 
adopted popular energy demands, citizens’ protests succeeded in empowering 
some of their political representatives. Where protests left organisational 
legacies or coalitions, these played no role in democratising energy 
policymaking. 
4.1 Nigeria: Protests as political theatre 
4.1.1 A cycle of protest and response without reform 
The Nigeria case suggests that protests have empowered citizens to demand 
public action: the official response has been to either cut the pump price, make 
new social protection provisions, or both. These responses then became 
ammunition for the next struggle, as evidence that protests had ‘worked’. We 
agree with Camilla Houeland that ‘[n]one of the historical fuel subsidy protests 
altered the system, but they contributed to shifts in popular ideas, civic action 
and institutional politics’ (Houeland 2020: 1236). Nevertheless, our research 
suggests that those shifts were temporary or partial, and amounted to neither an 
empowered citizenry nor accountable public authorities in any institutionalised or 
lasting sense.  
The frequency of protests suggests their inability to effect long-term policy shifts 
that people can broadly support. The trajectory is predictable: government cuts 
the subsidy; fuel prices rise; activists and labour unions mobilise crowds; 
protests erupt; government invites labour union leaders (not activists, not the 
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masses) to negotiate; the subsidy is partially restored, and prices of fuel products 
revert, although not to the original price. The repetitive, almost ritual, nature of 
the response to protests do not suggest that citizens gain power from their 
protests, but that they are trapped into short-term responses with no serious 
prospects of satisfactory resolution. 
Concessions granted to protestors are often little more than political theatre: 
citizens and government know protests will occur, there will be negotiations, and 
that government will be forced to reverse cuts to some extent, so they announce 
a larger initial cut than they expect to make. As a government official with 
authority over these issues explained: 
The government would be determined to increase fuel prices and 
would say okay, they want to increase it to N10 from N8 but they 
know that people would scream and shout so they’d increase it to 
N12 so that everybody can scream and shout, and then they bring it 
to N10, which was their original intention.  
(KII 16, Nigeria) 
Such actions are a double win for government: subsidies are reduced, but the 
government also demonstrates its compassion and responsiveness. Labour 
leaders also win, because as one interviewee explained: ‘Labour will not lose 
face before their people, and government would have achieved what they want 
to achieve’ (KII 13, Nigeria). 
4.1.2 Organised actors and the escalation of protests 
The role of organised labour raises further questions about the extent to which 
protests empower people over energy policymaking: in three major and five 
minor protests analysed for the Nigeria case study, organised labour under the 
Nigeria Labour Congress or the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria actively 
involved civil society groups, and other citizens supported activist groups in 
mobilising members and other citizens (Houeland 2018). However, governments 
typically negotiated with union leaders alone, in many cases introducing new 
benefits for the civil servants represented by unions. Non-unionised citizens saw 
few benefits.  
Although not in direct response to the protests, the Goodluck Jonathan 
administration created the short-lived SURE-P to mitigate the impacts of the 
partial petroleum subsidy removal on the population by laying a foundation for 
developing a national safety net programme; accelerating economic 
transformation through investment in infrastructure projects; and promoting 
investment in the petroleum downstream sector (Omafume 2014). Several high-
profile infrastructural projects were awarded, such as the Benin-Ore expressway, 
the reconstruction of the Lagos-Ibadan expressway, and some investments in 
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railway projects. Achievements in social protection and health services were 
more modest: 120,000 jobs were created for youth, women, and disabled, and 
12,000 health care workers were recruited, providing services to 800,000 women 
(Omafume 2014). No formal evaluation has been undertaken of SURE-P, which 
appears to have ended without replacement.  
Some energy protests did not even achieve such limited wins. In 2016 the 
Muhammadu Buhari administration cut subsidies and the petrol price jumped 
from N87 to N145 (US$0.23 to US$0.38) per litre. Unions and federations called 
strikes, organised marches, and disrupted traffic. However, few citizens joined 
the protests, and the price of fuel stayed at N145 per litre. One reason was that 
most people had goodwill towards the new government of Muhammadu Buhari 
who was personally known for integrity, in contrast to the Jonathan 
administration of 2012, on whose watch corruption was widely reported. A 
second reason was a growing understanding of the nature of the subsidy regime 
in Nigeria. By 2016, people understood the subsidy system was thoroughly 
corrupt, and that fighting to retain the subsidy was actually fighting for the 
interests of the ‘subsidy cabal’. One focus group discussant from a low-income 
community put it succinctly: ‘Ko si subsidy kankan; sosapo lo wa. [Meaning; 
‘there was never a subsidy; there was/is only the pocketing of the nation’s 
money’] (Male, FGD 04, low income). 
A third reason protests were large and sustained in 2012, but not in 2016 
appears to be that the ‘big actors’ who supported the protests in 2012, providing 
transport, refreshments, and even rockstar entertainment, were not active in 
2016 (in part, because many of them were in government). Protests can be 
stimulated by unions, political opposition groups, and other influential actors, 
even though they emanate from mass concerns. But these organised actors, 
including the opposition Action Congress of Nigeria, are seen by some to 
‘capture’ the protests for their own purposes, subverting the protest goals to 
pursue political goals apart from citizens’ energy concerns. 
4.1.3 Pointless protests 
Protests also failed to take off in 2016 because rather than developing 
confidence in their own agency and ability to affect government’s energy policy, 
protesters had protest fatigue as a result of revisiting the same issues without 
achieving any long-term gains. A common argument was that the concessions 
sometimes made by the government in response to protests were a ‘consolation 
prize’. One man who had protested in 2012 said: 
Many people died, and those that died have wasted their lives. 
Nowadays no one wants to protest. We are resigned to our fate. We 
do not want to die. After all, the government knows that if they 
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increase it, people will protest, and they will reduce it a bit and no 
one can hold the government accountable.  
(Male, FGD 02, low income) 
Another discussant who had also engaged in the 2012 protests expressed 
similar reasons for opting out of further protests, saying: ‘Why should I go again 
in 2016? The one of 2012, what came out of it? What was the result?’ (Male, 
FGD 09, low income).  
Research participants noted that women and men often had different energy 
priorities: women’s unpaid care work depends particularly on access to cooking 
fuel, an issue around which energy protests rarely mobilise. However, we 
uncovered no clear sense of a gender divide with respect to energy grievances. 
Women were less likely than men to take to the streets to protest price hikes for 
a range of reasons, but in 2012, respondents noted that women both came onto 
the streets and struck by staying home. Fear of police and army violence was 
one reason most protestors were young men, but their grievances were framed 
as national issues, not as the problem of male urban informal sector workers. 
Women and men viewed the protests similarly, with age and stage of life the 
more significant dividing line between those who protest (mostly young urban 
men) and those who do not. Respondents commonly noted that the state’s 
security agents were more prone to repression than in the previous 
administration, further reducing their incentives to protest. 
In assessing the potency of popular struggles to empower people over 
policymaking in energy provisioning, lessons from Nigeria show that while 
protests usually follow increases in fuel pump prices, protesters’ demands 
ranged from the reversal of price rises to improved management of petroleum 
resources, and an increased minimum wage. However, beyond the occasional 
reduction of fuel prices, other demands tended to be ignored. The 2012 
protesters in Lagos demanded a referendum before the implementation of the 
controversial fuel sector deregulation policy. Protesters in Abuja during the 2012 
episode demanded that the government not only reinstate fuel subsidies, but 
also unveil an updated budget showing that the subsidy funds had been duly 
reallocated. Protesters in Benin City wanted the resignation of the finance 
minister among other demands. These demands met with no response, and do 
not even appear to have been considered. 
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4.2 Pakistan: Getting outages on the political 
agenda 
4.2.1 Organisational support for protests 
As in Nigeria, the Pakistan case showed that major energy protests were not the 
spontaneous eruption of angry citizens but were supported and enabled by pre-
existing organisations. In the working-class Lahore neighbourhood of Chungi 
Amer Sidhu, activists linked to local labour unions and a local left-wing political 
party aiming to compete in local elections, formed a community-based 
organisation to deal with service delivery complaints of residents. Other 
members of the protesting public included former women councillors with ties to 
politicians from the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party and the Pakistan 
Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML(N)). These organisers were supported by local 
shopkeepers and businesses who saw their ability to mobilise young people from 
the area as a useful way to pressure public authorities.  
Similarly, protests in the town of Kamalia, including the major riot in June 2012, 
would not have taken off without the backing of the politically and socially 
important market traders association (Anjuman-e-Tajran Kamalia). Their linkages 
with political parties, particularly the PML(N) in Punjab, helped mobilise large 
crowds to protest outages. This pattern – of civil society organisations fronting 
protests with organisational backing from opposition politicians – recurs in many 
instances where energy protests went to scale, and political party leaders and 
activists have been central to the escalation of energy contention in Pakistan.  
4.2.2 Gender, class, and protest 
The Pakistan case found that popular mobilisation around energy mainly 
featured young urban men and was often inattentive to the needs of other social 
groups – women and children, rural people, the poorest. Protest organisers were 
on many occasions better-off urban men, with frontline protestors from the 
working or lower middle classes. In the protests in Kamalia, for example, trader 
association representatives called for the protest, held the ‘shutter-down’ strike, 
and then ordered employees (sales staff, loaders, and helpers) to block the main 
highway. The original protestors were then joined by local constituents of the 
opposition party politician who had subsequently joined the protest as well.  
Women may not take to the streets in large numbers around energy issues, but 
in Chungi Lahore, numerous service delivery complaints – related to water 
shortages, electricity bill distortions and outages, and natural gas disruptions – 
originated with women residents, who depend on these forms of energy more 
because of their responsibilities for care work. Women are also the primary users 
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of household electricity, and so are directly affected by outages. Disempowered 
socio-economic groups (fringe urban communities, rural consumers) are affected 
more than wealthier and urban people. Even within these groups, there is a 
gendered dynamic to questions of affordability: women respondents in Chungi 
explained that pricing remains a pressing concern, because of the trade-offs in 
household budgets that have to be made to pay for electricity, with impacts 
typically on women’s unpaid care responsibilities. Frequent overbilling, for 
example, is a persistent complaint, but one that most respondents live with to 
avoid disconnections or further surcharges. These class and gender dynamics 
point to areas of concern around energy that do not impact on public discourse 
and political events in the way that supply disruptions and outages have. 
Different groups may experience energy shortages differently, but our interviews 
found that public authorities prioritised generation enhancement and supply 
consistency precisely because outages affect groups and communities across 
social class divides. Home-based solutions like fuel-run generators are costly 
and inadequate substitutes, especially for commercial and industrial purposes. 
This is why pressures to ensure electricity provision came from across elite, 
middle-class, and working-class actors in the form of protests and in extensive 
backdoor lobbying. 
Interviews with protest participants in Kamalia and Chungi and with decision 
makers at the field and policy levels pointed to mixed legacies of protest from an 
empowerment perspective. Protest organisers in Chungi felt protests had been 
effective: that outages were now less common was, they felt, the direct result of 
people coming out on the streets to hold public authorities to account. This view 
was echoed by members of the Kamalia traders’ association, who said that ex-
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had paid attention to the demands of the public 
when he took office in 2013, unlike Zardari (leader of the Pakistan Peoples’ 
Party) who had ignored them. 
At the same time, other protest participants were reluctant to connect their 
presence on the streets to decisions eventually taken by the government to 
improve generation capacity. Decision making is notoriously insular in Pakistan, 
and there is little institutionalised contact between voters, politicians, and those 
governing the energy sector. Several respondents in Chungi complained that 
even if the supply of electricity had improved, their concerns about costs had 
been ignored, and electricity distribution company officials ignored their 
complaints about overbilling. However, officials interviewed during the research 
appeared wary of prolonged supply outages given the protests witnessed 
between 2007–15. Officials explained that ‘mobs’ posed an acute threat at that 
time, and that the spectre of electricity protests continues to condition how they 
tackle outages and public anger.  
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4.2.3 Political responsiveness without public accountability 
Politicians and other senior decision makers echoed the energy concern, noting 
that the electricity supply had become a political non-negotiable since the peak 
of the protests. Electricity played an important role in shaping electoral outcomes 
in 2013, and representatives of mainstream parties acknowledge that an outage 
crisis can prove a political death knell. A senior politician involved with the 
electricity sector reform process commented that:  
MNAs [Members of the National Assembly] would visit Islamabad 
(the capital) and tell us they were afraid to go into their constituencies 
because of anger. [A politician] said he had a PhD in swear words 
and even he hadn’t heard some of the abuse words he received 
during his visit to sootar mandi (yarn market in Faisalabad). This is 
the party’s core support base and it had to respond to it someway. 
Although electricity outages had become a matter for political competition and 
political accountability, affordability and associated service delivery aspects were 
neither prioritised nor addressed in any meaningful way. The architecture of 
energy governance saw no substantive change during or after the supply crisis. 
Decision making continues without political or civil society oversight or public 
participation. The legacy of contention has, so far, been absorbed into broader 
service delivery politics focused on supply but has not led to the formation of civil 
society organisations to articulate citizen voice on the issue.  
That the issue of energy has been less overtly contentious since 2015 is not a 
result of repression. It is more closely associated with the fact that the demand of 
the most influential segments within those protesting has been met. Remaining 
concerns around affordability mainly affect poorer populations that are under-
represented in the political mainstream, and do not feature in the rent-driven 
incentive structure of elite actors. Similarly, that no viable organisational form has 
emerged to represent citizens’ concerns relates to the underlying legacy of weak 
civil society in the country, and that much organising within the civil society 
domain is closely shaped by international donor agencies. More work is needed 
to clarify the implications, but it does seem that international donors have not to 
date given a high priority to empowering citizens with regard to energy.  
We did not find that the Pakistani state reduced space for protests, even during 
the peak of the crisis. Violent police action was witnessed in a minority of cases, 
with protracted negotiations and political leverage often deployed by municipal 
administrators to defuse protests. Part of this can be traced to critical features of 
the political opportunity structure in Pakistan and reflects the prominent socio-
economic and political profile of those organising the contention, as well as 
tensions between federal and provincial governments which restrained police 
deployment. The outage crisis affected everyone, and there were strong 
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sympathies between local administrations, including police, and protestors. 
These conditions help to explain why there was no escalation in state violence or 
further restriction of civic space.  
4.3 Mozambique: ‘Authoritarian responsiveness’ 
Mozambican protestors faced the most closed political opportunity structure 
when it came to protesting food, fuel and electricity price rises in 2008 and 2010. 
The state’s heavy-handed responses to the eruptions of 2008 and, particularly, 
2010 narrowed the possibility of a third major protest when grievances around 
the cost of fuel and food resurfaced in 2012 and again in 2016–17. Compared to 
Nigeria and Pakistan, Mozambique’s energy protests yielded the weakest 
evidence that citizens gained power to hold authorities accountable. 
Mozambicans’ concerns about energy have met with ‘authoritarian 
responsiveness’ (borrowing from de Brito et al. 2017) and pushed commitments 
to ‘Energy for All’ onto electoral agendas, but without establishing citizen 
participation in policymaking, or political representation of people’s energy 
concerns beyond this vague discursive commitment.  
4.3.1 A lack of organisational support 
In this single party dominant political system, there is no strong tradition of 
organised opposition. MDM had been gaining ground through the period of the 
protests (2007–13) (de Brito et al. 2017), and urban and peri-urban livelihood 
concerns help explain why. Civil society groups were neither independent from 
the ruling party, nor closely connected to popular concerns, with limited 
accountability to grassroots constituencies and agendas that tended to reflect 
donor funding priorities. Violent protests in 2008 and 2010 grew in a 
spontaneous way, amplified, and spread through SMS and popular culture.  
Organised actors were not visible in the protests, which lacked obvious leaders. 
The apparent lack of leadership might help explain why the rapper Azagaia 
faced charges when a ringtone of his song was deemed to have instigated 
protests. The state took a heavy-handed approach to repressing major protests, 
and every time that there seemed to be increased circulation of social media 
messages calling for popular mobilisation, the armoured vehicles brought in to 
dampen the 2010 protests were deployed to places where crowds had gathered 
during those protests to remind the population that people had died because 
they had protested.  
Energy has become more politicised in recent years, in particular with popular 
complaints about the lack of an energy payoff to Mozambicans from national 
ownership of the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric dam. These complaints appear to 
be chiefly channelled through social media, and it is not clear what political 
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impact they have beyond lip-service during election campaigns. The political 
economy of energy in Mozambique has become a high-stakes game, and there 
are no reasons to believe that citizens will be granted a seat at the energy policy 
table. 
4.3.2 Responses to urban and peri-urban energy grievances 
The Mozambican government has moved ‘between responsiveness and 
repression’ (de Brito et al. 2017) in its response to energy and related livelihood 
protests, but learned to keep a tighter control over media, communications, and 
protesting publics. In order to keep the prices of privately owned public transport 
affordable the government introduced a compensation package for petrol 
stations; this ultimately failed because of administrative delays. In 2017 the 
government ended the generalised fuel compensation scheme and shifted to a 
flexible pricing regime with a few of the most politically sensitive targeted 
subsidies (such as those for diesel-fuelled fishing vessels) being maintained.  
The deployment of the army and excess violence against protestors has had the 
desired effect, in that former protestors have had little appetite for further 
struggle. One male former protestor from the Maputo neighbourhood of Polana 
Caniço put the general view in these terms:  
People demonstrated in the past years, as they did in 2008, but now 
people are afraid. Government action is wrong. The government is 
aware of citizens’ problems but creates barriers for any type of 
demonstration. The fear of repression makes people withdraw. The 
excessive use of force prohibits citizens’ options. 
(KII 34, Mozambique) 
Other former protestors were of the view that protest was not only dangerous, it 
was also pointless. As one young woman from the Maputo neighbourhood of 
Benfica put it: 
Now I think that I would not participate in another strike. The things 
that happened there were not very good. Especially now that I have 
other [family] responsibilities. In a strike you can get shot or go to jail. 
[…] After the strike, nothing really changed. The bread and the 
chapa went down in those days, but then they went up again, so 
nothing changed.  
(KII 42, Mozambique) 
In this context, social media has become an outlet for popular complaint. While 
memes and WhatsApp messages are often humorous expressions of widely 
held grievances, they are also critical, and express a broader sense of discontent 
with the energy – and other – policies of the regime. 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 555 






5. Transnational actors and energy 
protests 
Our research on transnational actors was exploratory, and our findings on the 
roles of transnational actors in energy protests are preliminary: data collection 
was disrupted by Covid-19, and research teams found some transnational actors 
in the energy sector inaccessible, a challenge reflected in the exclusive and 
closed spaces in which energy policymaking takes place. Worldwide, energy 
policymaking is a high-stakes activity involving national security and high profits 
and losses (and frequently extensive corruption); it is (as a result) opaque and 
closed to public oversight or scrutiny.9  
Our starting assumption – that transnational actors played a significant role in 
protests by insisting on fuel subsidy cuts as part of multilateral austerity 
packages – was not supported by our findings. The IMF and the World Bank play 
a role in Mozambique, Nigeria, or Pakistan, but that role is more mediated, less 
direct, and possibly less important than other factors, including other 
transnational actors. However, the link between multilateral agency policies and 
protests warrants further attention: multilateral agencies have a duty to do no 
harm, and policy prescriptions can alter the political opportunity conditions that 
make protests likely. Violence frequently occurs during such protests, and such 
political effects can be predicted. There is, therefore, a question of accountability 
for policy prescriptions likely to result in riot, even if the policy choices are 
ultimately those of governments and not the World Bank or the IMF.  
The role of the private sector, including multinational energy firms, in energy 
policy has also proven difficult to study. This is in large part because of the 
insulated and secretive nature of energy policy decisions, and that in turn relates 
to the high stakes in terms of geopolitical and national strategic considerations, 
and of the massive rents to be earned in the sector. Parts of government have, 
we could propose, relatively strong incentives to keep private sector involvement 
in energy a closed matter, and to avoid citizen participation or civic oversight.  
5.1 Transnational actors in Pakistan’s energy 
regime 
Since 2007, Pakistan has had three IMF programmes (2008, 2013, 2019) on the 
back of ballooning fiscal deficits and balance of payment crises. While subsidy 
 
9  The recent book, World For Sale: Money, Power and the Traders who Barter the Earth’s Resources, 
documents the rise of the global commodity traders in the wake of the 1970s’ oil crises and the end of 
the Cold War, noting that they are a notoriously secretive group, as befits the often insalubrious deals 
that have enriched them (Blas and Farchy 2021). 
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removal was a key pillar of each programme, it was particularly prominent in 
2008, which coincided with the uptick in electricity related contention. However, 
the mechanism through which removal and protest are related is not 
straightforward. Subsidy removal was largely related to the tariff differential 
subsidy (TDS) offered by the government to bridge the cost of generation and 
the prices charged to the end-consumer. The IMF, ADB and the World Bank 
recommended regular increments in tariff to full-cost recovery, to gradually 
remove the TDS. Successive governments have been reluctant to comply with 
this fully, given the inflationary and politically sensitive impact of increases in the 
electricity tariff. However, IMF programme fiscal deficit conditionalities also 
meant governments were restricted in what they could spend on the TDS. 
Without subsidies to cover the cost of fuel and generation, private sector 
electricity suppliers stopped producing, leading to outages. 
Overall, then, the IMF’s advice for subsidy removal and tariff adjustment was 
indirectly linked to the outage crisis (and its ensuing protests) because it placed 
restrictions on the amount of money the government could spend to keep 
generation online, while keeping tariffs low. In both the 2008 and the 2013 
programmes, electricity tariff rises were a key conditionality, that restrained by 
political considerations, governments complied with only partially. While IMF 
restrictions on government spending cannot be blamed for the outages, IMF 
conditionalities shaped the context for significant electricity related contention. 
Donor agency interviewees downplayed their influence and role in the electricity 
sector. A World Bank and an IMF staffer both pointed out the gap between what 
multilateral agencies had proposed and what policies had been adopted.  
Transnational actors played a major role in shaping the overall electricity sector 
in Pakistan. The primary reform process that led to privatisation of generation 
and a reduced role of the state on one end of the supply chain was conceived 
and led by the World Bank. Since the start of Pakistan’s private electricity market 
in the late 1990s, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has made direct 
investments of over US$850m in 19 projects. The electricity sector is highly 
centralised with the federal government bureaucracy controlling almost all 
aspects of purchase, transmission, and distribution. Political oversight is limited 
to the prime minister’s office and the ministers for finance and energy (or water 
and power as the case was earlier), with preferential access given to powerful 
domestic business conglomerates (and increasingly Chinese companies) 
involved in electricity generation. Since 2015, electricity outages declined 
dramatically, largely as a result of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 
collaboration, which is responsible for US$33bn of investment in the power 
sector through to 2022. 
Given the country’s bureaucratic structures and history of authoritarian rule, 
parliament continues to have a negligible role in energy policy formulation, while 
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civil society organisations working in this space are either absent or too weak to 
influence political discourse; at the same time, fiscal constraints and structural 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities that lead to periodic crises enhance the role 
played by lenders and donors in the country’s political economy. It is within this 
environment that transnational actors and technocrats retain a privileged and 
considerably insular place in framing the debate around energy in Pakistan, one 
that has not changed much even after a prolonged period of crisis between 
2007–15. 
External investment in energy infrastructure is likely to be highly contentious, as 
China’s increasing footprint on Pakistan’s energy sector from 2013 onwards 
indicates. Electricity generation projects, sponsored by Chinese loans and 
built/operated by Chinese companies, have not been subject to substantial 
political oversight or deliberation. The government’s own investigation into the 
financial health of the electricity sector revealed that in the case of two large coal 
power projects, Chinese investors asked for an unconditional acceptance of an 
up-front tariff, which was accepted by the National Electric Power Regulatory 
Authority (NEPRA). Concerns raised by environmental and food security activists 
have been ignored, justified by the government with respect to national security 
and development. Public authorities have repeatedly cited national security and 
geo-strategic factors as justifications for the lack of transparency and heightened 
centralised control around Chinese investment in the country (Boni and Adeney 
2020). 
5.2 Transnational actors in Mozambique’s energy 
sector 
In the past two decades, energy has moved to the centre of Mozambique’s 
international politics and economics. First, with the reversion of Hidroeléctrica de 
Cahora Bassa (HCB), the company that runs the Cahora Bassa dam which was 
built by the Portuguese colonial regime in the 1970s with the explicit intention of 
earning export revenues by selling power to South Africa and Rhodesia 
(Isaacman and Isaacman 2013). Second, with the expansion of the exploitation 
of fossil fuel resources – in particular gas and coal – in Inhambane, Tete and 
Cabo Delgado provinces. The Tete coalfields have attracted Brazilian, Indian, 
and Anglo-Australian mining companies, SASOL of South Africa is expanding its 
natural gas extraction operations in Inhambane, and US, French, Italian and 
Chinese firms have sought stakes in the huge natural gas basin off the coast of 
Cabo Delgado, with British Gas emerging as one of the major prospective clients 
for the region’s LNG. International oil firms (including GALP from Portugal and 
BP from the UK) also dominate the cartel of distributors that negotiates 
international transport fuel purchases with the Mozambique government and 
controls distribution through the country’s network of petrol stations. 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 555 






Despite their huge influence these external actors are not visible in the country’s 
day-to-day energy politics and as a result residents in Maputo do not seek to 
hold them accountable to policies related to fuel prices or access to and quality 
of electricity. ESKOM, the South African energy utility which buys HCB’s 
electricity and then resells it to EDM at a much higher price, is not perceived as a 
driver of the dysfunctional electricity supply situation, which most simply blame 
on the corruption of Mozambique’s own ruling elite. The external actors that play 
a more visible role in struggles over energy access, quality and affordability are 
the donor agencies and international financial institutions (IFIs) who are 
increasingly active in the sector. The role of the IMF and World Bank in pushing 
for subsidy reform is acknowledged, though they are not considered responsible 
for the rising prices of electricity. Bilateral donors, including USAID, the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID, now FCDO), Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ – German organisation for 
international cooperation), the Netherlands and Norway, are most active in the 
off-grid solar sector (through programmes such as the UK aid funded BRILHO 
programme), with only USAID taking on a high visibility role in pushing for 
liberalisation of the electricity sector and regulatory reform (Nhete 2007; Cipriano 
et al. 2015; Lopes and Bambo 2016; Power et al. 2016). As noted above, 
development partners are cautious in their negotiations with the government 
about cutting subsidies as it opens the possibility of violent repression of 
protests. 
In the 2010s, with support from the Brazilian government, Mozambique 
unsuccessfully attempted to generate biodiesel from jatropha and palm oil and 
ethanol from sugarcane. Brazil and India have been major players in developing 
plans for the export of 99 per cent of Mozambique’s coal output, mostly for 
steelmaking in Asia, though Brazilian mining giant Vale recently announced that 
it would be selling its operations in the Tete coalfields as part of a plan to exit the 
coal business. International donors and the energy interests of national 
governments as well as international energy initiatives such as the Power Africa 
programme and the UN-led climate change convention process have been major 
influences on energy policy. South Africa reaps most of the benefits of affordable 
energy from Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa dam, and militant groups have 
emerged in the struggle over the Cabo Delgado gas fields, the development of 
which have not benefited the local population. Foreign investment in the 
development of the gas fields has taken place without public deliberation or 
transparency, and there have been concerns about the terms of contracts and 
the environmental and social impacts of resettlement programmes. 
Donors have often sent mixed signals – providing support for energy transitions 
to cleaner fuel on the one hand – while heavily subsidising fossil fuel 
development on the other. For instance, in Mozambique UK Export Finance 
(UKEF) has pledged US$800m worth of support for an LNG train project in Cabo 
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Delgado led by French oil major TOTAL, more than the UK gives for energy 
transitions or access through its aid programme. The frustrated expectations 
generated by gas development in Cabo Delgado have helped to drive a local 
insurgency that has now escalated to the point where TOTAL has been forced to 
put the project on hold. The violence in Cabo Delgado, which has seen almost 
700,000 people forced to flee their homes and numerous reports of atrocities 
committed by government forces and South African and Russian mercenaries 
working with them, as well as by the Islamist rebels, has combined with a 
worsening outlook for global gas prices to trigger a collapse in investor 
confidence in the gas fields of Northern Mozambique. The failure of promised 
foreign investment to materialise is likely to push the government back towards 
greater reliance on the IFIs and bilateral donors. 
5.3 Transnational actors in Nigeria’s energy sector 
Nigeria is the largest oil and gas producer in Africa, the ninth largest gas 
producer in the world, and has the tenth largest crude reserves in the world 
(BudgIT 2019). Such wealth has attracted transnational involvement since its 
discovery in 1956. Multinationals including Shell, Exxon, Chevron, and other 
major oil companies extract and export up to 2m barrels a day of high quality or 
low sulphur ‘Bonny Light’ crude from the Niger delta. Very little is refined in 
Nigeria because its four state-owned refineries are non-functional. International 
traders export around 900,000 tonnes a year of low-grade, ‘dirty’ fuel, produced 
in Dutch, Belgian and other European refineries to Nigeria (Vidal 2020). With 
proven crude oil reserve estimates of about 37 billion barrels in 2015, Nigeria 
has the world’s second largest crude reserves. However, Nigeria is also one of 
the largest consumers of refined products in Africa and accounts for over 7 per 
cent of Africa’s refined products consumption. Imports currently account for over 
80 per cent of Nigeria's refined product supply (PWC 2017). Efforts on the part of 
the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to overhaul its refineries 
have to date failed. In 2016, following a plunge in oil prices, sabotage of oil 
installations and crude theft, Nigeria sought external financing for its refineries, 
but investors were unconvinced about the viability of the venture (Bala-Gbogbo 
2019). It is very difficult for refineries to be viable when the price of their main 
output – fuel – is heavily subsidised. 
Political leaders and champions of energy sector reform have long struggled with 
the powerful alliances of domestic and foreign interests that ensure the 
governance of energy remains opaque. As the Nigerian Finance Minister at the 
time of the 2012 protests, and since 2021 the Director-General of the World 
Trade Organization, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, put it: 
The story of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector is ugly. Although revenues 
from the sector have, to a substantial extent, helped finance the 
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country’s development, the impact of the sector has fallen short of 
expectations because of inappropriate policies, inefficient and non-
transparent institutions, corruption, capture by leaders, and rent-
seeking internal and external elites. 
(Okonjo-Iweala 2018: 54) 
The World Bank and IMF have consistently supported fuel subsidy elimination in 
Nigeria as part of broader macro-fiscal and oil sector reforms. Their support has 
been based on an assessment of the real, opportunity and implicit costs of the 
vast petrol subsidy, which had amounted to 0.4 per cent of GDP by the time it 
was, supposedly, removed in 2020. Apart from the price distortions and 
corruption engendered by the subsidy scheme, both the World Bank and the IMF 
viewed it as a significant constraint on fiscal space, and therefore on investments 
in human development (IMF 2019a; World Bank 2021).  
Multilateral support for subsidy elimination has also depended on an assumption 
of the possibility of investments in social protection on a significant scale to 
alleviate the effects for the poorest; these are assumptions which the majority of 
Nigerians do not appear to share.  
For example, in 2019, the IMF noted that: 
Analysis based on Nigerian household data shows that a removal of 
the implicit subsidy (through an increase in the regulated price of 
Premium Motor Spirit, PMS) would reduce income inequality and, if 
combined with targeted transfers, could result in a decrease in the 
poverty gap while leaving significant fiscal space for other productive 
expenditures.  
(IMF 2019b: 23, emphasis added) 
That ‘targeted transfers’ could be implemented so as to alleviate the pain of 
higher fuel costs seems a significant leap of faith, given Nigeria’s own recent 
past experience. An IMF account of the Nigerian experience with fuel subsidy 
reforms in 2012 noted that the government had been unable to persuade its 
political allies or the wider population of the need for reforms, despite a six-
month campaign of advocacy and information (Alleyne and Hussain 2013):  
This proposal [to cut fuel subsidies drastically] was hotly debated in 
the press, by business and civil society groups, and it was debated in 
the National Assembly during the rest of the year, with the 
government strongly trying to make a convincing case. On January 
1, 2012, the price of gasoline was raised to a cost-recovery level—a 
117 percent increase. The price of kerosene, a cooking fuel used 
mainly by poorer households, was not changed. However, in 
response to intense social unrest, the government scaled back the 
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price increase to 49 percent by mid-January. Evidently, despite six 
months of debate, the measure did not enjoy sufficient public 
support.  
(Alleyne and Hussain 2013: 93) 
The state had failed to build trust in its willingness or capacity to reinvest fuel 
subsidy funds in social policies and programmes, which citizens widely believed 
would instead be lost to corruption and inefficiency. Indeed, the SURE-P 
programme, announced just before the 2012 cuts, did not survive the tenure of 
President Goodluck Jonathan. Nevertheless, up until the removal of the fuel 
subsidy was announced in 2020, World Bank and IMF official documents 
continued to profess the hope that social protection instruments would be 
designed and delivered to mitigate the pain caused.  
Yet the popular perception that the Bank and the Fund forced Nigerian 
governments to cut subsidies, perhaps by withholding finance, is not upheld by 
the research findings. A representative of the NPEC said that the World Bank 
and the IMF raised subsidy removal in negotiations over loans, and that 
diplomatic representatives similarly lost no opportunity to push the government to 
cut subsidies. Yet several respondents noted that the pressure of international 
actors like the World Bank, IMF, and donor governments had not been effective, 
in large part because politicians and government actors had stronger incentives 
to retain subsidies, including the need to win elections and the material benefits 
from the leakages in the subsidy system.  
Resistance to the recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank is popular 
with the wider public: the devastating effects of structural adjustment left a legacy 
of popular antipathy towards the multilaterals, which has enabled opposition 
political actors to resist or even mobilise against reforms. Nevertheless, the 
government announced the removal of the mechanism for setting fuel prices in 
2020, indicating its intention to leave fuel prices to market forces, an intention 
that had not (as of April 2021) been enacted. At the time, during the Covid-19 
pandemic, protest was relatively muted. However, since then there have been a 
large number of protests against police brutality, among other issues.  
The IMF takes a paradoxical view of what the reduction of fuel and electricity 
subsidies may mean for living costs and widespread discontent and protest. At 
the height of the coronavirus pandemic, they noted that: 
The authorities have undertaken commendable and timely measures 
to counter the pandemic’s impact on lives and livelihood. These 
encompassed palliative measures, a strict lockdown, removal of 
fuel and electricity subsidies as well as fiscal and monetary policy 
support for the health sector and the economy.  
(IMF 2021: 5, emphasis added) 
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This suggests a view that the removal of subsidies was a ‘commendable and 
timely’ way of cushioning the effects of the pandemic on people’s lives. This very 
likely reflects the IMF’s view that subsidies are inequitable and a drag on social 
spending, and that in the medium and long term, the pain to the Nigerian public 
will be lessened through their removal and the reallocation of these resources for 
other purposes. The IMF acknowledge the scale of the economic and health 
crisis facing Nigeria. In the same report they also note that: 
In October, mass protests against police brutality started under the 
ENDSARS movement.[10] Social discontent has widened since the 
beginning of the crisis with rising food inflation, elevated youth 
unemployment and high social inequality. Headline inflation reached 
14.2 percent in October 2020, a 30-month high, while the 
unemployment rate reached 27 percent in 2020Q2, with youth 
unemployment increasing to 41 percent. Surveys conducted by the 
Nigerian authorities also show a significant economic impact on the 
vulnerable, including a precarious food security condition.  
(IMF 2021: 6) 
However, the IMF position ignores two important ways in which subsidy reforms 
affect mass protests and social discontent. First, while oil prices were low during 
the pandemic, they have risen rapidly in recent months, causing the subsidy to 
escalate. The IMF will have been aware of this possibility but does not seem to 
have fully considered the hardship which would be caused by (and therefore the 
political infeasibility of) steady rises in domestic fuel prices as the oil price 
recovers. Second, the multilaterals should be in a position to know that violent 
responses to justified protests scar the relationship between citizens and their 
state, reducing trust and making reform more difficult. In situations such as 
Nigeria in 2020–21, there are strong arguments to be made for reform agendas 
to adopt pathways that are slower but have a lower risk of violence. The chances 
of building social consent over the longer term are likely to be greater. 
International private actors have been implicated in the subsidy scams. 
Respondents suggested complex connections between multiple international 
private actors and fuel marketers exploiting loopholes in tender processes and 
subsidy schemes. The subsidy scam had three transnational dimensions. First, 
oil firms had international networks and used loopholes in registrations and 
licensing to enable their actions to benefit from the schemes. According to one 
oil and gas consultant respondent, private marketers set up offshore businesses 
or firms abroad to complicate the chain of actors, with each actor adding a 
 
10  The ENDSARS movement targeted police brutality in Nigeria, and in particular the extrajudicial actions 
of the Special Antirobbery Squad (SARS). In late 2020, a large number of protests against SARS took 
off across Nigeria, with strong social media support. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End_SARS 
(accessed 18 June 2021). 
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premium, in order to present higher bills to the Nigerian government. As 
Nigerians could set up firms in other countries as part of the chain, the boundary 
between domestic and transnational was blurred. Second, individual actors 
involved in subsidy corruption were enabled by transnational financial networks 
that enable flows and stores of illicit wealth (such as multimillion-dollar properties 
in Dubai) (Page 2020). Thirdly, not just Nigerian but also courts in other countries 
have been involved in bringing fraudulent actors to justice. The CEO of Capital 
Oil was charged by a court in the UK and had assets frozen worldwide. Another 
UK court jailed the chairman of Ontario Oil and Gas for international fraud and 
money laundering (Olowookere 2018). 
The funds for subsidies cannot be seen in isolation from the revenues generated 
through oil production, and licenses regularly face allegations of corruption 
involving international private actors (Oseni 2017; Hildyard 2018). In 2014, 
accounts of corruption in the Strategic Alliance Agreement (SAA), the scheme 
through which NNPC allocates oil fields to private actors, illustrated how a web of 
transnational and Nigerian actors prevent revenues from oil production from 
reaching federation accounts. In 2013, the Central Bank Governor Lamido 
Sanusi accused the NNPC of failing to remit billions of dollars from crude oil 
production, as required by law, to the federation account. He claimed that the 
SAA was a fraudulent scheme through which local and international oil 
companies looted the national treasury, and was fired for his troubles (BBC 
2014) Nevertheless, in 2014, the IFC committed US$150m to one of the 
companies implicated in Sanusi’s accusations, which watchdog groups 
considered to be lacking in due diligence (Hildyard 2018).  
Subsidies have also leaked through illicit transnational networks of smugglers 
between Nigeria and neighbouring countries in the region (Mlachila et al. 2016). 
The court cases resulting from what is widely known as ‘the subsidy scam’ have 
brought limited accountability and have not affected a more transparent 
governance of the fuel subsidy schemes. The complex of political and economic 
actors, which has transnational dimensions, are a major barrier to enhancing the 
accountability of the schemes. 
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Protests about energy are increasingly common and consequential, and on 
notable occasions in the current century have unseated regimes, unleashed 
state violence, disrupted economic and social life, derailed economic reforms, 
and triggered broader movements against corruption and misrule. Most research 
on energy protests has to date focused on protests against fossil fuel use, mostly 
in the global North. There has been less analysis to date of protests against 
energy price rises and scarcity. These are concentrated in the global South and 
involve the fight for the right to affordable energy, which government and 
protestors alike often consider most easily delivered via subsidies. These two 
types of energy protest are at odds in their immediate aims, yet reflect a common 
concern about energy policymaking: that it is undemocratic, unjust, and 
unsustainable. A starting assumption of the present research has been that 
energy price and scarcity protests are significant political events, which need to 
be understood and responded to if energy transitions are to be just or 
sustainable.  
This paper presented a synthesis of findings of research into protests against 
energy price rises and scarcity which aimed to centre protestors’ concerns about 
energy. It was motivated by a recognition that these events were politically 
significant, illuminating the nature of the contemporary state-society relationship 
in an era when modern forms of energy are increasingly necessary for everyday 
life in the global South. The research also recognised that such protests 
frequently block efforts to cut fossil fuel subsidies, which are deemed damaging 
on fiscal and environmental grounds. Policymakers concerned to advance the 
cause of fossil fuel subsidy reduction need to understand why energy protests 
occur, why they escalate, and why the grievances they express can persist, even 
when protests die down. Through literature review, cross-country analysis of 
violent fuel-related protests, and three in-depth case studies of major protest 
episodes in Mozambique, Nigeria and Pakistan, the research was designed to 
explore why and how energy protests escalated, and whether political fragility 
and conflict were contributing factors.  
The research found that protests triggered by grievances about energy acquired 
a particular potency in settings where other means of expressing grievances 
were absent, weak, or blocked. But there have been major energy price and 
scarcity protests across political and energy regimes, levels of development, and 
regions. While economic and political conditions in fragile states may create 
opportunities for such protests to escalate, energy protests can create or 
contribute to political fragility, depending on how governments respond to them. 
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The research found little evidence that the raw power of energy protests 
translated into sustained empowerment of citizens with respect to energy policy, 
or in their relations to the state more generally. Many people perceived protests 
to have won power, but these gains could be subverted, stolen, or subsumed 
within other agendas. Meaningful gains in citizen power after energy protests 
occurred were short-lived and diffuse, dissipating in the absence of 
institutionalised mechanisms of citizen empowerment, or of sustained civic 
organisations or movements. Protestors learn that they can force governments to 
listen, but that protests rarely elicit more than a heated public hearing, followed 
by often temporary policy change. Governments learned new tactics for cutting 
subsidies, resorting to repression, or waiting for a more opportune moment. 
The limited evidence that energy protests empowered citizens was matched by a 
lack of public accountability to citizens, for energy or other essential public 
services. In the more disruptive episodes of protest, governments backed down 
on proposed price rises or introduced short-term fixes for electricity shortages. 
State tactics were to ward off protests, but rarely involved a visible strategy of 
strengthening public accountability for energy policy. The fleeting sense of power 
that protestors gained when they did succeed created a self-reinforcing cycle: 
protestors believed these were their only tools, while governments feared the 
protests, but expected the resistance to dissipate in time.  
Energy contention uncovers a ‘wicked problem’: while neither citizens nor the 
state are satisfied with the outcomes, the tested strategies of each deepen the 
impasse and reinforce the conflict. Current strategies for subsidy reform and 
energy policy formulation offer no solutions to addressing citizens’ energy 
grievances.  
Transnational actors play a range of roles in this landscape of energy protests, in 
ways that are often hidden or obscure. Multilateral aid actors influence subsidy 
reform, but through indirect means. Multinationals and foreign governments are 
critically important actors in national energy policy in the global South and are 
part of the reason why energy policymaking remains closed and secretive.  
In this context, it is notable that aid donor support for civil society and good 
governance has not supported popular domestic movements for climate justice 
or energy security. In countries in which international aid has been an important 
resource for civil society, this helps to explain why civil society channels for 
citizens’ energy grievances are blocked. But while transnational policy and 
business actors are implicated in contention around energy in the global South, 
transnational (Northern) civil society actors play no such role in popular protests 
against energy price rises and scarcity (or energy poverty).  
A key conclusion of the research is that citizens’ protests, in settings where the 
state has little restraint on its violence, and alternative means of expressing 
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grievances are limited, have been the desperate last resort of people hard-
pressed to cope with rising costs of living and inadequate energy supplies. 
These need to be recognised as political claims, which seek to mandate states to 
ensure people have access to the modern forms of energy they need for daily 
life. The protests fail to empower citizens to hold their states to account for 
energy. If anything, states retreat further into insulated and technocratic policy 
spaces to resolve energy problems. A key lesson is that when the political 
opportunity structures permit, people will protest against energy policies that 
prevent them from meeting the living standards they need or expect, in large part 
because they have no other means of making governments listen to their 
complaints.  
There are no easy answers to these complex matters. But without understanding 
why people protest against cuts to energy subsidies, there is no chance of 
designing lasting reforms that move societies towards fair energy transitions and 
climate justice. The evidence marshalled here points towards responses that 
appropriately and effectively centre people’s experiences as users of energy. 
Citizens need to be engaged in energy policymaking, rather than having 
solutions imposed upon them which will not stick, or if they do so, will prove 
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Table A1 Protest episodes in Mozambique, 2008–20 
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Table A2 Estimated deaths, injuries, and arrests 





number of deaths 
Estimated number 
of people arrested 
Estimated number 
of people injured 
2008 4–10 140 >100 
2010 10–13 148–300 443–500 
2011 0 0 0 
2012 0 6-12 0 
2013 0 0 0 
2014 0 0 0 
2015 0 0 0 
2016 0 0 0 
2017 0 0 0 
2018 0 0 0 
2019 0 0 0 
2020 0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ analysis, based on newspaper and social media-based events catalogues. 
Figure A1 Access to clean fuels and cooking 
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